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Abstract 
 
 
 
 This dissertation was written as part of the MSc at the Classical Archaeology and 
Ancient History at the International Hellenic University.  
 Alexander the Great is the key figure that concentrates around his personality 
many aspects of the ancient world. Here in this study, we will estimate how a 
Macedonian state and the army, which were effected under the strong influence and 
perception of the ex-monarch Philip II, operated under the rule of a new heir, 
Alexander III. The aim of this survey is to examine Alexander’s Balkan campaign of 
335 BC, from various sides. Many ancient writers wrote for Alexander although for 
this first campaign we have only one significant testimony that of Arrian; other 
ancient authors abridged a lot their accounts. Moreover, at some points vague 
remains of a Ptolemaic papyri can help. 
 Firstly, the strategic aims will be analyzed, by revealing to us deeper causes, 
reasons and aims of the realization of the Balkan campaign, apart from the 
traditional view and reason that Arrian accounts. Then, the multiple successful 
tactics will follow, which would enlighten us on the ability of “young” Alexander in 
the military field. This fact is significant due to the fact that we already all know how 
charismatic Alexander was in the military affairs, although here at his first steps we 
will see many prototypes and differences at his command. Finally, this study will 
offer the opportunity to the reader to be familiar with the logistics of a campaign. 
The field of logistics is dark because of the few evidence that the ancient authors left 
behind, while every knowledge focuses on the Asian campaign. Here, the logistics of 
the Balkan campaign will be presented, and how they functioned in the concept of a 
campaign. 
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                       Introduction 
 
 
 No respectable study for Alexander the Great can be written, without referring 
first to the contribution of Alexander’s father, Philip II, in its introduction. As 
Errington once said: «No Philip, No Alexander”.1 About the Balkan campaign of 
Alexander, it is important to be aware about who was the man who offered 
ascendancy to the Macedonian kingdom to the Balkan vast regions. Ι would like to 
emphasize that in this essay, when I refer to the Balkan campaign, I mean the route 
of Alexander until Danube and the war with Cleitus and Glaukias in Pellion. In this 
introduction, we will shortly mention the contribution of Philip towards Macedonia 
and especially to the regions of Balkans. 
 To begin with, Philip received a decadent state and raised it to the leading 
authority in the Mediterranean world.2 Some paradigms of his achievements are 
that, Philip systematically eliminated the menace from the neighbors of Macedonia 
and from south Hellenes,3 he created a consolidated and centralized kingdom, he 
transmuted the royal iconography and dynastic perception,4 he created a 
professional unique army,5 and finally he reinforced the economy of Macedonia by 
creating an era of firmness and welfare, a condition that Macedon had never felt 
before.6 
  Philip expanded his kingdom and made Macedonia great and vast. Pertaining to 
Philip’s action and the subjugation of Thrace, we can add Fox’s comment: “Philip had 
played one Thracian king against another beyond Macedonia’s north-east borders 
and settled an impressive network of new towns through modern Bulgaria as far 
north as the river Danube and the Black sea. He had controlled most of the huge 
rough hinterland of his road to Asia and enjoyed the rich rewards of its royal tithes”7 
In fact, Philip subjugated the Odrysian kingdom at 341 B.C. when he crushed the 
                                                          
1Errington 1990,99. 
2Muller 2010,183. 
3Muller 2010,183, Errington 1990, 100-101 
4 Muller 2010,183. 
5 Diod, 16.3.1-.3.3,Muller 2010,183, Errington 1990,99, Strauss 2003,142, Gabriel 2010,61-81 
6Muller 2010,184. 
7Fox 2004,81. 
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Thracian king Cersobleptes.8  Philip was dominant in Thrace from the great Balkan 
range in the north, to the Aegean Sea in the south and from the Nestus River east to 
the Black Sea.9 Diodorus informed us about the reason of the campaign. Philip 
desired to put an end to belligerence of the Thracians against the Hellenic cities, and 
led his vast army against the Cersobleptes. After two years of continuous fighting, 
Philip achieved his goal. He forced barbarians to pay a tithe to him, and he 
established many cities in special points, with the aim of reducing the aggressiveness 
of the barbarians forever.10 
 Moreover, more important reasons, discovered behind the final campaign of 342 
B.C. At this Campaign, there were special strategy plans, which Philip knew and 
needed. To begin with, the danger of Persia was alive. Persia used to invade Hellas 
by crossing the Hellespont and moving its armies by land through Thrace. Thus, 
Philip needed eastern Thrace as a necessary occupation to block and defend any 
attempt of Persia against him. Secondly, with Thrace in his occupation, Philip would 
have the chance to meet Persian forces early and perhaps to hinder their landing. 
Even if he failed to act like this, it was better to fight in Thrace rather than meet the 
enemy on Macedonian land. All in all, if Philip aimed at a future invasion of Persia via 
Ionia, he would lead that attack from Eastern Thrace, because this area would serve 
as a strategic point for the invasion. We must not ignore that the size of his army 
supported his desire of the ultimate conquest of all Thrace.11 
  In general, concerning Philip’s action in Thrace, we can add that he conquered 
the Odrysian kingdom after the surrender of Cersobleptes as I already mentioned 
and subjected Thrace beyond the Strymon and along the mountains to Macedonian 
rule. The Odrysian kingdom which ruled Central Thrace, was a part of the Hellenic 
political history from the late of 430s to the middle of the fourth century, had fallen 
victim to its internal dynastic rivalries and to the increasing Macedonian 
expansionism under Philip. For the actualization of this achievement, Philip 
perpetrated several campaigns across southeaster Thrace (353-352, 346, and 342-
340 BC) and further north to the land of Getae and beyond the Danube to the 
                                                          
8Xydopoulos 2010,213. 
9Gabriel 2010,186. 
10Diod. 16.71, Xydopoulos 2010, 213. 
11Gabriel 2010,182. 
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remote stranger land of Scythians (339). Philip knew that Thrace could provide him 
with vast natural and human resources.12 
 Nonetheless, he also experienced the unstable territorial conquests to the north 
of Mt. Rhodope and the weak point of the northern border of Thrace. His own 
campaigns, north of Mt. Haemus and of Alexander against Maedi (340), Triballians 
and Getae (335) aimed at securing parts of the borders from dangerous neighbors, 
more specifically in the north and the northwest of Thrace.13 The most significant 
development was that Macedonian hegemony created the new phenomenon of 
colonization to Thracian land. Almost four centuries after the settlement of the first 
wave of Hellenes colonists on the Thracian coast, the Macedonians started a second 
wave, due to the fact that they had established a network of fortified military 
colonies which were inhabited by mix populations, along with special strategic 
places, e.g. Philippopolis on the Hebros and Kabyle on the river Tonzos.14 These 
towns introduced civic institutions into inland Thrace and developed into new 
trading centers and maybe served as garrison towns. Nonetheless, Thrace was never 
incorporated into Macedonia, for administrative purposes there was the office of 
strategos of Thrace, to command the new conquered area. A tithe was necessary to 
paid15 by the Thracians and some Thracians would be recruited by the Macedonian 
army.16 The area that Philip subjugated in twenty years from the moment he became 
the Macedonian monarch, was considered the first land empire in Europe.17 
  However, except for this great accomplishment of Philip, we must mention some 
conflicts with some tribes, which had an impact on later events i.e. the campaign of 
Alexander at 335 B.C. Philip crushed the Scythians, at the campaign of 339 BC. In this 
campaign, the eighteen-year-old prince Alexander, accompanied his father.18 The 
Casus Belli was an insult of the Scythian king Atheas to Philip and the necessity of 
Philip for loot, according to Justin.19 Philip accepted the behavior of Atheas as hostile 
and he believed that the expansionism of Scythian king would create hazard to his 
                                                          
12Loukopoulou 2015,467. 
13 Loukopoulou 2015,467-469. 
14Ibid, 467-469. 
15Loukopoulou 2015, 467-469, Fox 2004,81, Diod. 16.71. 
16Loukopoulou 2015, 467-469. 
17 Hammond 2007,422 Gabriel 2010,203. 
18Justin 9.1.8, Ηammond 2007,303. 
19Justin 9.1-9.2. 
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ambitions in Thrace. Hence, it was this reason that lead Philip to deal with Scythians 
at 339 BC. Philip tried to hide his intentions by sending a delegation requesting safe 
passage in order to erect a statue, but it was refused.20 So, as it was logical, a great 
battle had to happen. Scythians were superior in courage and numbers, but they 
were defeated by the charismatic commander Philip, who gained a great booty.21 
Hence, Philip incorporated Athea’s kingdom, which extended from south of the 
Danube to the Sea of Azov, to his kingdom.22 This campaign against Scythians maybe 
was a great lesson for Alexander, which proved valuable in the future in Asia.23 
  However, on his way back to Macedonia, Phillip passed from the territory of 
Triballians, a harsh tribal people, known for their cavalry and the utilization of the 
long cavalry lance. The Triballians refused to let Philip pass, unless he offered them a 
part of the Scythian booty. A battle began whereby Philip injured and his horse was 
killed while the Triballians ripped off a part of the giant loot.24 As Justin said:  Ita 
Scythica uelut deuota spolia paene luctuosa Macedonibus fuere.25 
 Regarding the Illyrians, Philip defeated them many times, with most important 
the clash with Bardylis for the security of Macedonia in 358 BC. at the early reign of 
Philip.26 Two years later, Parmenio defeated the Illyrian Grabus. 27 Demosthenes 
referred that in 350 BC, Philip took his army and marched against Illyria, Paeonian 
and Molossia, but we have no other accounts to support that this occurred.28 
However in the events of 344/343 according to Diodurus: κατὰ δὲ τὴν Μακεδονίαν 
Φίλιππος πατρικὴν ἔχθραν διαδεδεγμένος πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν 
ἀμετάθετον ἔχων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως. πορθήσας δὲ 
τὴν χώραν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πολισμάτων χειρωσάμενος μετὰ πολλῶν λαφύρων 
ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν.29 
                                                          
20Worthington 2008,139. 
21Ibid. 
22Worthington 2008,139. 
23Hammond 2007,305. 
24Gabriel 2010,203. 
25Justin 9.3. 
26Diod. 16.4.3-4.7. 
27 Plut. Alex. 3.5, Just. 12.16. Diod. 16.22.3,Hammond 1966,244,Gabriel 2010,114,Greenwalt 
2010,291-292. 
28 Gabriel 2010,146. 
29 Diod. 16.69.7. 
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  These Illyrians were the Dardanians. The hatred that Philip inherited from his 
father was towards the heir of Bardylis. The year that Philip started the campaign 
was maybe in 345 BC. Philip campaigned against Dardanians with great forces. He 
defeated them with war or with deceit but the result of the campaign was that Philip 
was recognized as being dominant over their king who was maybe Cleitus the son of 
Bardylis.30 Philip continued, with the aim of conquering the neighbors of 
Macedonians, who were the Ardiaioi at 344/3 BC. Pleuratus was the king of this 
tribe. During the pursuit of the Illyrians, Philip and 150 hetairoi were injured. It is 
possible that Ardiaioi were subjugated and their king become subject to Philip. Of 
course, these conquests supported the economy of Macedonia since he had 
incorporated into his kingdom the most productive part of modern Albania.31 In 337 
BC Philip would come back again to Illyria, to fight with a tribal king whose name was 
Pleurias.32 
 Concerning Illyria, Philip managed to force the tribal aristocrats to accept his 
hegemony. However, he left them to handle their internal tribal affairs and left their 
kings in office e.g. Cleitus. Philip just wanted peace among the tribes, acceptance of 
his foreign policy, to receive payment especially in precious metals and to use the 
elite troops when he demanded. There is no sign that he revolutionized the Illyrian 
way of life by establishing cities or encouraging native towns something that was 
done in Thrace.33 
 The end of the mighty Macedonian king came in 336 BC during the great wedding 
of his daughter with Olympias, Cleopatra, with king Alexander of Epirus at Aiges, in 
front of important Hellenes and Macedonian nobles, Philip was assassinated by 
Pausanias who was one of his bodyguard of him.34 Alexander came to the throne 
after the death of his father. Immediately he was proclaimed king by nobles in the 
palace in Aegae and by commons in an assembly at Aegae. A solemn assembly 
occurred some days later, where Alexander was presented as king and promised to 
                                                          
30Hammond 2007,253-255. 
31Hammond 2007,255-256, Hammond 1994,439. 
32Hammond 1994,439,Gabriel 2010,178. 
33Hammond 1994,439. 
34 Diod. 16.91-94.3, Grainger 2007,66. 
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continue his father’s policy.35 Afterwards, a bloodshed followed in the Macedonian 
court where dangerous individuals for the brand-new authority of Alexander were 
neutralized. The restless turmoil in Hellas was eliminated with a whirlwind campaign 
with the result that Alexander received the authority and the leadership of Hellenes 
for the Persian war. Before he set out for Asia, he went against the aggressive 
neighbor tribes.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35Bosworth 1988,26. 
36Bengtson 1991, 302. 
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                     Chapter I 
 
     Strategy Aims and Reasons for the Balkan Campaign  
 
 Ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, ἐς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριούς (Arr. 1.1.4) 
 
 After Alexander finished with the affairs of Hellas, as he believed, he returned to 
Macedonia. Alexander remained in Macedonia for the winter 336/5 by giving to his 
soldiery a good training routine in mountain warfare. Thusly, Alexander prepared his 
troops for the upcoming campaign that would took place, when the passes would be 
relieved of the snow.37Arrian informed us that with the inception of spring, he 
marched against Triballians and Illyrians, since he had learned that they were 
restless.38 
 From Macedonia, two paths lead to the Triballians, one up the Axius (Vardar) 
valley, and through the Paeonian and Agrianian country. The second path was from 
Amphipolis northward through the region of the independent Thracians and across 
the Haemus mountains. The reason that Alexander selected the path from 
Amphipolis is because the Agrianians were friendly, in contrast to the free Thracians. 
With an advance to the eastern path, he would entrench his authority and to free 
Thracians, while he would pass and from the equivocal Odrysae.39 Alexander’s aim 
was to subjugate the belligerent mountain tribes who frequently sortied the 
flatlands in the past. This is the major reason why Alexander advanced through the 
mountains of Rila, Pirin and then Haemus.40 In fact, the king exploited this campaign, 
with the aim of confronting the Thracian tribes who had revolted and desired their 
                                                          
37Green 2013,124, Fox 2004,72. 
38 Arr. An. 1.1.4. 
39 Fuller 1960,220,Dodge 2004,189,Droysen 2012,79-80. 
40Hammond 1989,56. 
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independence.41 The region of the free Thracians was the first movement of this 
operation.42 
 Hammond –Walbank refer that when the intelligence reached Alexander that the 
Triballians and Illyrians were ready to revolt, he started from Amphipolis with the 
spring and did not aim to go towards the Morava valley where the Triballians were 
nearby the Illyrian Autariatae, nevertheless in the norther slopes of Mt. Haemus, 
beyond which located the most eastern subjection of the Triballians. In the next 
chapter we see the path that he followed more detailed. It seems that the specific 
route served his plan for the separation of Thrace in two, so that the tribes of south-
eastern Thrace and in fact the Odrysians, who were the most powerful, had no 
choice to unite forces with the Triballians.43 
 Alexander had already accumulated experience fighting the Balkan tribes. In 340 
BC, Philip was preparing to leave Pella for a campaign against Byzantium. He left the 
16-year-old Alexander as regent and Antipater as adviser. After the absence of Philip, 
the Maedians revolted, a Paeonian tribe on the Upper Strymon River close to Thrace. 
Alexander marched north and ended the revolt. The victorious adolescent, in order 
to keep the people in check, he transferred people from Macedon, Hellas and 
Thrace, to go and reside in his new town, which received his name, 
Ἀλεξανδρόπολιν.44 Of course his military up growth, continued with the north 
campaigns of his father’s in the 339 BC against Scythians and afterwards Triballians 
as I mentioned.45 Moreover, Droysen states that Alexander defeated Illyrian Pleurias 
in the war of 337 B.C.46 This conflict is unknown, unknown if truly occurred and 
versus who Illyrian enemy? While Greenwalt dates this campaign at 336.47 Droysen 
and Greenwalt are based on the passage of Curtius 8.1.25 where there is a mention 
of this incident.48 Moreover, it is important to note that, when Alexander abandoned 
Macedonia with his mother and went to Molossia, he then went towards the Illyrian 
courts. He possibly visited the subordinate kings of Gravani, Taulantians, and of 
                                                          
41Worthington 2004,53-54. 
42English 2011,22. 
43Hammond,Walbank 1988,34. 
44Worthington 2004,36., Plut. Alex.9.1. 
45Bosworth 1988,21. 
46Droysen 2012, 65. 
47 Greenwalt 2010,293. 
48 See : Curt. 8.1.25 
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Dardanians and for sure gained knowledge of the northwest boundaries that would 
be very precious for the future in 335. These movements could only have happened 
with the permission of Philip and with the permission of Philip, Alexander came back 
to Pella in 337 BC.49 
 Subsequently, Alexander was now king, and he believed that he must give a 
lesson to the barbarians, due to the fact that the Asian campaign was near and he 
couldn’t let them free.50 This action was logical and necessary. Except for the 
difficulties with the southern Hellenes, Philip’s death had brought similar turmoil to 
the northern border of Macedon. Alexander could not start his eastern campaign 
until his kingdom was secure from the south and the north.51 As Plutarch stated 
about the attitude of the Balkan tribes: “οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βάρβαρα καὶ πρόσοικα γένη 
τὴν δούλωσιν ἔφερε, ποθοῦντα τὰς πατρίους βασιλείας”.52 
 In fact, the Thracians that were in the vast realm of the Odrysian kingdom were 
not the only tribes in Thrace. There were other ethne too, that were autonomous 
due to the fact that they were not subject to Odrysian kingdom and were searching 
to escape from the chaotic political situation, which resulted from the decay of the 
Odrysian power.53 These tribes i.e. Getae, Triballians, Scythians attempted to profit 
from the Macedonian conquest, as they believed that the anarchy and the fall of 
Cersobleptes, would be to their advantage. The Triballians, as long as the father of 
Alexander was alive, were independent after the known battle of 339 BC. It was 
logical to be the first ones to create problems just after King’s death.54  Papazoglou 
refers, that it is difficult to know the grade of Triballian dependency on Macedonia 
after their subjugation to Philip, and she supposes that is highly possibly that 
Triballians either denied to pay tribute to the king or they wanted to invade 
Macedonia.55  However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Triballians offered 
a tribute to Macedonia. In fact, the Triballians who were the strongest among the 
                                                          
49Hammond 2007,386-387. 
50 Arr. An. 1.1.4. 
51 English 2011,21. 
52Plut.Alex.11.1. 
53 Xydopoulos 2010, 213. 
54 Xydopoulos 2010,214. 
55  Papazoglou 1978, 25, Xydopoulos 2010,214. 
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Thracians, according to Strabo,56 were not under the authority of Philip, they were 
independent.57 
  Droysen, marks out that Thracians, Getae, Triballians and Illyrians which 
bordered with Macedonia in three sides were subjects of Macedonia or allies with 
Macedonia without their will, in the era of Philip. Furthermore, the Illyrians had 
suffered many defeats from the Macedonian troops. Therefore, now that Philip was 
deceased, they had the opportunity to flee from the Macedonian control and to 
invade Macedonia, through pillage and destruction, following the steps of their 
forefathers.58 
 Alexander was aware that the submission of these tribes was not enough; his 
northern frontier could be safe only if he pushed it far away until the Danube. This 
was the main strategic aim that urged him northwards. It was an act of conquest and 
this view can be reinforced by the fact that a fleet appeared in the Danube, at the 
specific point that was arranged.59 Alexander knew that in these regions there was 
always great turmoil from the era of Philip’s campaigns. A simple strike would not 
achieve significant security during his absence, and that it would just delay the 
danger. The Danube could be the final defensive boundary that would protect 
Macedonia from the Balkan neighbors. A diplomatic solution would not be the 
perfect choice for Alexander. The Balkan tribes had fought each other for centuries 
with the aim of obtaining booty and slaves. As it is logical, they had little desire to 
make peace with neighbors, when they preferred to be at war.60 
 In general, we can detect many reasons for the realization of the Balkan 
campaign. To begin with, it would maintain the borders and it would leave Antipater 
as regent with full liability for the untrustworthy Hellenes, while the King was far 
away. Antipater would not need to divide his forces to watch the northern tribes 
because Alexander would be there.61 That Alexander didn’t trust the south Hellenes 
is revealed by Arrian, who clearly informed us that when Alexander was informed 
                                                          
56 Strab. 7.5.6 
57 Errington 1990,56. 
58Droysen 2012, 77. (Again there is no evidence for the subjection of Triballians. Moreover, we cannot 
claim that they were allies of Philip.) 
59Fuller 1960,219 , Hamilton 1973,46 Green 1991,124, Ashley 1998,167. 
60Ashley 1998,167. 
61Hamilton 1973, 46, Green 1991,124, Ashley 1998,167. 
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about the revolt of Thebes, he decided to act immediately, because for a long time 
he was suspicious of the Athenians, and this threat of Thebes was considered serious 
if the Spartans and others Peloponnesians along with the Thebans and with the 
unstable Aitolians renegaded together.62 Secondly, it would make it clear for the 
Thracians and Illyrians that Alexander was not weak and not different from his 
father, that he was a worthy heir. Thirdly, it would serve as tactical training for the 
troops, as preparation for the long journey to Persia.63 
 Another significant incentive, can be found in revenge. Whether Philip prepared 
a revenge campaign against Triballians is unknown. Nevertheless, Alexander would 
surely take his revenge.64 Droysen refers that, the wounded Philip returned to 
Macedonia without punishing the Triballians. Afterwards, necessary circumstances 
forced him to go towards Hellas and later to a war with Illyrian Pleurias, which 
required his concern and before he could advance again on the Triballians, he died.  
Droysen continues by saying that Alexander resolved to fight against the Triballians 
who had not yet been punished.65 Fox adds that Alexander started in 335 his 
northern campaign with the aim of taking revenge for his father and to safeguard the 
flanks of the route between the Macedonian and Asian incursion.66 While, Hamilton 
rightly says that although Alexander had a personal rivalry with the Triballians to 
solve, going back to 339, he aimed towards a larger expedition reaching the 
Danube.67Τhe idea of revenge is peculiar , although it seems very common to the 
Macedonian world. Pausanias murdered Philip for purposes of revenge.68 
Hermolaus, a royal page plotted to kill Alexander for revenge, because he was 
flogged by Alexander, when he first struck a wild boar that Alexander intended to 
strike during a hunt. Because of this action, Alexander removed him off his horse, 
which was a symbol of elite representing his elite status.69 Moreover, the death of 
Archelaus, and of Amyntas the little at 394 BC occurred maybe for reasons of 
                                                          
62Arr. An. 1.7.4 
63Green 2013,124-125, also Worthington 2004,53 ( for the final reason). 
64Worthington 2004,53. 
65Droysen date, 78-79.( Contrariwise , Ashley vaguely reports that Philip, after the calamity of 339 BC, 
he invade Triballian territory and force the Triballians to accept his authority. Ashley 1998,115.) 
66Fox 2004,81. 
67Hamliton 1973,46. 
68Aristot. Pol. 5.1311b. 
69Muller 2010,27-30 , Sawada 2010,403. 
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revenge.70There are many paradigms of such actions in Macedonia that arise out of 
the thirst for revenge. The Macedonian world especially for the elite, was an 
agonistic society that was characterized by Homeric values. In fact, the ardor for the 
achievement of personal power, was a specific characteristic of the kings and elite.71 
Alexander was raised by believing in Homeric perception for the personal success, 
for the sake of honor and glory, as he had a great love for Iliad, when he slept he had 
Aristotle’s copy of Iliad under his pillow.72 So, it’s not illogical that Alexander wanted 
to punish the Triballians, who with their action at 339 assaulted the pride and honor 
of the Macedonian throne. As Bosworth says, there was reputation to be restored.73 
Τhe Triballian unpunished presence was already an insult, let alone now that they 
rebelled. 
  Worthington supports that one more urgent reason for Alexander, was to win 
the trust of his men in battle. At the age of 16, he had defeated the Maedians on the 
Upper Strymon. Nevertheless, at the Balkan campaign, he was a king and there was 
likely objection to his authority. So, this campaign would secure his authority as king, 
before the dawning of the Persian campaign.74 English suggests that since Alexander 
was accompanied by a large part of his field army for this reason, Macedonia’s 
western frontier was undefended. He claims that Alexander acted like this, because 
the Balkan campaign was the first of the king and he need it to forge a large army for 
the conquest of the Balkans. Secondly, his authority as king was not secure and 
Alexander kept the army with him, with the aim of preventing some rivals of his 
sway, that were alive in Macedonia, to convince a part of the army that Alexander 
was not the legitimate heir to the throne.75 This opinion is convincing, if we accept 
the view that the Macedonians i.e. the assembly, was the institution whereby some 
of their duties were to declare or dethrone kings, and judge cases for treason. These 
armed Macedonians seemed to be the state.76 
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 One important fact is that Alexander did not demand that the most capable 
generals of Macedonia, i.e. Parmenio and Antipater should accompany him in this 
campaign. In fact, Antipater was a specialist in Illyrian matters.77 The answer to this 
is simple. First of all, Alexander needed Antipater in Macedon as regent while he was 
absent, while Parmenio was sent to Asia with forces.78 Secondly and most 
importantly was that Alexander was already popular among his soldiers for his 
achievements against Maedians and for the battle of Chaeronea. He wanted to show 
that he was a capable king and true heir of Philip, as we mention. In my opinion, this 
is the main reason that he didn’t had with him his experienced generals as Parmenio 
and Antipater. He desired to show to his army that he could achieve glory in war 
alone, without the advice of the eldest noble Macedonian men of his father’s. 
Moreover, the best audience to show your power is your own men. If we exclude the 
Agrianians that followed him in the Balkan campaign, the majority of men were 
Macedonians.79 The king had to demonstrate his leadership. 
 Another important strategic reason for Alexander was the financial 
reinforcement of the kingdom, via a successful campaign to the Balkans. Alexander 
had ensured the throne but Philip had left Macedonia without money in the public 
treasure, while Alexander’s generosity at his succession, with the payment of the 
taxation, resulted in a huge economic problem.80 Alexander had received a 
practically bankrupt state while his own preparations left him with no money. Any 
treasury would be necessary for the state.81 When Alexander went back to 
Macedonia, after the league of Corinth (336), he offered 150 gold Philips to the 
temple funds of Delphi when he received a satisfaction reply by Pythia. As Green 
refers “Not a princely sum, but by now the captain-general was embarrassingly short 
of ready cash”.82 It is generally known, that a campaign has some costs, for the 
supplies and equipment of the men, albeit a campaign can provide an army with 
wealth. During the wars, the armies always found wealth in the loot of the defeated 
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people. Balkan campaign is not an exception to this rule, since during the campaign 
Alexander always sent booty back to Macedonia. The fact that Alexander orders for 
the return of the spoils of war back to Macedon indicates that there was a 
substantial wealth.83 The latter indicates that the Balkan campaign, amongst others, 
worked also as a financial aid to the kingdom.84 
 In addition, Diodorus inform us, that 7.000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians 
accompanied Alexander at the campaign of Asia.85 The Balkan troops that served in 
Asia, were operating as hostages for the continuation of peaceful behavior of their 
fatherland tribes. These tribes would not have the opportunity to revolt during 
Alexander’s absence, because many of their people would serve in the Macedonian 
army.86 Alexander from the beginning of the Balkan campaign, desired to establish 
the Macedonian authority in these regions and to succeed to receive some troops 
from his neighbors, with the aim of reinforcing his great expedition to the east.87 By 
that I mean that, his father had created a Balkan empire as I mention, hence with 
Alexander’s campaign and with the reassurance of Macedonian sway to these 
regions, Macedonia becomes great and powerful again. A fact that would help 
Alexander to undertake his Asia campaign. So, if he restored his control over Thrace 
and Illyria, he had a Macedonian empire which had under its influence many nations 
and people which would offer aid to the war against Darius III. Hence, Alexander 
aimed to lead a Macedonian empire against the Persian Empire, and not a 
Macedonia, smaller than the era of Philip II. 
 Finally, if we judge from Philip’s desire to conquest Thrace with the aim to serve 
its goals for the Asia campaign, we can detect a similar reason for Alexander’s will to 
reassure the Macedonian authority over Thrace. Hammond-Walbank state that 
Central Thrace intended to be transformed into a significant source of replenishment 
for the offensive Macedonian force during its advance along the south coast and its 
early action in north-west Asia, and afterwards for the guard troops which would 
protect the Hellespont region as a strategic point in Alexander’s line of 
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communication.88 Alexander was cognizant about how important the lines of 
communication could be.89 This settlement occurred during his peace with the 
defeated Balkan tribe leaders after the successful war with Getae.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88Hammond,Walbank 1988,39. 
89Fox 2004,81. 
90Hammond,Walbank 1988,39. 
21 
 
 
                      Chapter II 
 
            The Tactics of Alexander the Great at Thrace. 
 
καὶ οὕτω ξυνέβη ὅ πως παρῄνεσέ τε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ εἴκασεν.  οἱ 
μὲν γὰρ διέσχον τὴν φάλαγγα, αἱ δ᾽ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπίδων 
ἐπικυλισθεῖσαι ὀλίγα ἔβλαψαν. (Ar.An 1.1.9-10) 
 
a. Mount Haemus 
  
 With the inception of spring, when the conditions were appropriate for 
mountainous military expeditions,91 Alexander advanced forward against the 
Triballians and Illyrians for the reasons already mentioned in Chapter 2.92 He avoid 
the Morava Valley because the Triballians were neighbors to the Illyrian Autariatae, 
but he moved to the southern slopes of Mt. Haemus, beyond the further eastern 
conquests of the Triballians. Furthermore, Alexander selected a quirky route with 
the aim of destroying the autonomous Thracian and entering the central plain before 
the enemy expected him to be there.93 He started with his army from Amphipolis, 
north through the Rupel pass next to the Strymon just south of Simitli, and from that 
place he possibly turned east into the thick wooded mountains of the republican 
Thracians, and reached the Upper River Nestus by Razlog.94 (Image 1) Hammond and 
Walbank suggest that Arrian doesn’t refer to some fighting in these regions that 
maybe occurred. It seems that Alexander maybe reduced some of the enemies and 
chased others who advanced at Mt. Haemus.95 Alexander passed the Nestus in 
Spring and his army covered 240 kilometers in ten days, through the highlands of Mt. 
Rhodope and then across the central flatland of Marica. By choosing this unique 
path, Alexander achieved his aim of separating Thrace in two parts, so the tribes of 
south-eastern Thrace and in fact the strongest i.e. the Odrysae, had no opportunity 
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to unite their forces with Triballians, as we already mention.96 Hammond-Walbank 
supports that when Alexander reached the Mt. Haemus he could have chosen a low 
pass at either end of the range, but Alexander pursued the republican Thracians, 
who ran to save themselves with their wives, children and with their belongings. 
Here as they suggest, Alexander followed the Shipka pass and found the pass on the 
top, occupied not only by those Thracians but also by mountaineers of Haemus.97 
  At this point we must make a short citation about a problematic affair i.e. the 
number of soldiers in the Macedonian army. This case is surrounded by hypothetic 
suggestions because Arrian didn’t refer to anything about the number of troops that 
followed Alexander at the campaign of 335 B.C. This matter provokes a turmoil, since 
many suggested numbers are offered from various scholars. To begin with, (some 
paradigms) Hammond suggests 25.000 men and 5000 horses.98 On the other hand, 
Bosworth refers to a “moderate –sized army” of 15.000 troops.99 Ashley and Loizos 
follow the opinion of Bosworth and refer to the same number of men.100 Next, is 
Worthington who states that Alexander took 20.000 troops including 5000 
cavalry.101 Strauss argues that Alexander marched from Thrace to Thebes at 335 BC, 
with 30.000 infantry and 3.000 cavalry.102 Finally, Sarantis says that Alexander began 
from Pella with 20.000 troops, and later this power was reinforced by the ally king of 
Agrianians Laggarus.103Whatever the number was, the authorities seems to agree, 
that this force was an original Macedonian force.104 
 The first campaign against the Triballians started with a detailed route from 
Amphipolis to the crossing of the Nestus. However, we have the march of ten days 
from Nestus to Mt. Haemus, and there is no citation as to which path was chosen. 
This is a result of the strong interest of Arrian in Alexander’s stratagem against the 
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autonomous Thracians, who defended the passes. It seems that it was not the most 
interesting concern regarding how Alexander arrived on the field of the battle.105 
Interest arises from the view of English, who underlines that the ten days route of 
Alexander from Nestus to Mt. Haemus was a slow march that occurred on purpose. 
Alexander wanted to connect the military land force with the fleet on the Danube, 
before he advanced against the Illyrians.  English says that the ancient fleets were 
not rapid vessels, hence Alexander marched at a slow rate in the rival territory with 
the goal of arriving at the correct time to the meeting point with the fleet. 
Otherwise, he would have to wait on the banks of the Danube for a long time and 
the food supplies of the region would be depleted by the troops.106 This view can be 
reinforced by the fact that the fleet possibly transferred supplies for the Macedonian 
soldiery. So, Alexander was forced to meet with the warships at the appropriate 
time.107 
  The most difficult part of this research is to find the topographical area of the 
route of Alexander. The majority of scholars seem to believe that Alexander followed 
the Shipka pass.108 Moreover, English strengthens this argument by supporting that 
Thracians chose to protect the Shipka pass due to the fact this was a strategic point. 
It was in higher position at 2437 m. in contrast with 1051m. of the Trojan Pass and it 
was narrower in contrast with the latter. So, why didn’t the Thracians defend both 
passages? Because they were not many soldiers and had no strong equipment which 
would offer them a chance to face a large superior force on both passes at the same 
time.109 
  On the contrary, there are some scholars who tend to believe that Alexander 
followed the Trojan Pass.110 Bosworth suggests the Trojan Pass due to the fact that it 
seems to have been used more frequently in antiquity. He argues that there was the 
Roman road from Philippopolis to Oescus in Triballian region. According to the 
Tabula Peutingeriana there was a bulwark, Montemno apparently on the pass itself. 
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Bosworth says, The Trojan Pass was more directly approachable from Philippopolis, 
and it is more possible to have been used by the Macedonian king.111 
 Whatever the path that Alexander followed, he found his enemy prepared to 
prevent his advance. They had occupied the narrow paths, while they had put their 
wagons in front as a stockade, to fight from there if they were pressured. Moreover, 
they had also thought to throw them to the phalanx when it would march against 
them from the most precipitous point.112 Dodge and Droysen refer that the rivals of 
Alexander, were armed only with daggers and with some hunting spears. Their heads 
were covered with fox or wolf hides rather than helmets. Hence, with this 
equipment they were not equal to Macedonian soldiery.113 In fact, this kind of 
equipment can be confirmed by paintings of Hellenic vases, as one bell crater of the 
5th century; which correctly connects it to the description of dress and armor by 
Herodotus.114 (Image 2) 
 There is ambiguity as to who the enemies of Alexander were in this phase of the 
campaign, except for the autonomous Thracians that was referred to by the ancient 
author. The word that is missing and was replaced by ἐμπόρων seems to create a 
turmoil among the scholars, and many theories have emerged. Bosworth’s opinion is 
interesting, he suggests that the original reading of Arrian is τῶν τε Τρηρών. Τhe 
Treres were Thracian inhabitants to the north-west of the Odrysian kingdom and in 
Thucydides’ time, they were located in the Triballian frontier. Theopompus referred 
to them (FGrH 115 F378) and presumably they were under the sphere of influence of 
Philip’s reign. The Treres were neighbors of the Tetrachoritae and probably sent 
troops to prevent Alexander’s march across the Haemus.115 
 Now who were the Θρᾷκες οἱ αὐτόνομοι? In the time of Thucydides, the 
autonomous Thracians were located in the range of Rhodope. The Thracians 
attacked by Alexander, appear to have lived in the Haemus, the northern range of 
Bulgarian mountains, which in Thucydides’ period they had divided the Getic people 
of the Danube from the Odrysian kingdom in the Hebrus valley. These Thracians 
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might be the Tetrachoritae, a people that were subsumed under the Bessi according 
to Strabo. The Bessi were the strongest tribe of the Haemus. The Tetrachoriatae, it 
appears to be the last Thracian people to fall under the sway of Philip. When Philip 
besieged Perinthus and Byzantium, the significant strategists of Philip i.e. Parmenio 
and Antipater were fought the Tetrachoritae. This campaign should be dated to 340 
BC. Since this people are in the recesses of the Haemus, they escaped from the total 
subjugation of the conquest of the Hebrus valley in342/341 BC and a separate 
campaign was necessary for their conquest.  Because Arrian calls them autonomous, 
we can say that maybe they were not vassals and their conquest was Philip’s 
unfinished job.116 
 Νow Arrian and Polyaenus, presents us with a full account of the fighting that 
took place. Alexander examined how he could most safely cross the ridge, he 
understood that there was no other road to pass the path. He had to fight, and he 
came there with the aim to clash. He soon realized the intentions of the Thracians 
and gave his intelligent command to his troops. This meant that when the wagons 
tumbled down the slope, those who had space to break the formation and to 
separate to right and left, leaving an avenue for the wagons. Those who had no 
room, were to crouch close together; and some were actually to lie down, to link 
their shields closely together so the wagons would pass over them. In this way, the 
Macedonians avoided the wagons by following the advice of Alexander and not one 
Macedonian perished. The Macedonians attacked with courage and frightening 
shouts.117 Shouting their war-cry “alalai”.118(Image 3) 
  Anyone else would have estimated that the Thracians aimed to use their 
stockade in a defensive way and to fight behind them. The Thracians wanted to trick 
Macedonians with this ruse and to throw their wagons when their rivals would 
march from the most precipitous point of the mountain. (Ar. An. 1.1.7). However, 
Alexander knew that their main tactic was a feral attack and immediately realized 
what his rivals were prepared to execute.119 Alexander’s tactic needed his men to act 
quickly as they saw the wagons descend. The rapid response of the phalanx was not 
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only a result of their training and of great courage, but also because of the huge trust 
they had for their commander.120 The same tactic used some years later at 
Gaugamela, against Darius scythed chariots.121 Important commanders remember 
stratagems that worked well before and Alexander would soon show that he 
memorized from reading and from experience.122 By that, we can say that this 
experiment worked in 335 B.C. during the Balkan campaign and adopted by 
Alexander as a main tactic against the chariots. Therefore, this tactic may have been 
used for the first time in the Balkan campaign. 
 Afterwards, Alexander put the archers from the right wing in front of the infantry 
to fire to the Thracians who would attack.123 Of course this was a protective 
measure, if the Thracians had intended to attack after the cathode of the wagons.124 
Alexander took his Hypaspists, Agrianians and agema and led them from the left. 
The arrows of the archers which were effective, in combination with the efficient 
Macedonian phalanx drove out the Thracians, who were light clad and ill–armed. 
The attack of the Macedonians was so effective and rapid that Alexander and his 
forces didn’t engage in battle in time. The Thracians threw their weapons and ran, 
while they left 1.500 deceased people on the battlefield.  Few were captured alive 
due to the fact that they were brisk, they knew the terrain well and they could 
escape.125 (Image 4) 
  Arrian informed us, that the strategic orders of Alexander, were given after the 
cathode of the wagons. Though, this might not be true, because these movements 
needed some time and if they had ordered the cathode of the wagons during all this 
disorder, the army would have faced some difficulties of organization. It is most 
possible that Alexander, as far as he has realized the intentions of the Thracians, 
organized the whole plan and the movements of his troops. He directly understood 
that the greatest jeopardy for his troops was not the wagons, but what would follow 
them, when his troops were disorganized.126 
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 Here, another interesting debate starts pertaining to the maneuver of the 
infantry. To give a small idea, can a heavy Macedonian infantry act like this when it 
holds the sarissa?  A weapon like the sarissa has some unique characteristics. To 
begin with, for the length of the sarissa there are many different testimonies of the 
ancient writers, nevertheless, it appears to be gradually increasing from 4, 5 to circa 
6 m. About its weight we can see that it is calculated at 3,3-6,2 kg.127 The 
Macedonian phalanx of Alexander, used sarissae that have shown to have been as 
long as eighteen feet and no shorter than fifteen feet, weighing circa fifteen 
pounds.128 This weapon was held with both hands by the Macedonian soldier due to 
its size.129 
 Let’s examine the case. Beginning with Bosworth, who appears to believe that 
the Macedonians were armed with small shield and sarissa. He suggests that: “The 
Macedonians were therefore forced to form a double shield-wall, a line of men lying 
on the ground and a second rank standing over them, their shields interlocking. The 
effect would have been an inclined ramp, composed of several successive tiers of 
shields. It is hard to see how the maneuver could have been carried out as effectively 
as described”.130 Fuller supports the idea that the slope, though steep, must have 
been flat, otherwise Alexander would not have arrayed in the battle formation of the 
phalanx.131 According to my survey, few scholars had analyzed this battle by 
concentrating in details and many seem to always connect the phalanx with the 
sarissa.  It is significant for us to realize the limitations of this weapon because of its 
sheer size and weight. These limitations make clear how this offensive weapon could 
operate in the battlefield.132 If we connect the sarissa with the Macedonian phalanx 
in each mission or campaign, then we fail to realize the true operations of the 
Macedonians soldiers and the true function and their military training.  
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 The word phalanx was first used by Homer133 to characterize any line of battle 
and more specifically the hoplite formation, but also the front formed by cavalry. 
Markle argues that “Hence in the ancient writers the designation Macedonian 
phalanx may legitimately refer to the whole Macedonian infantry, including archers, 
light infantry, hoplites with spears and sarissa-armed infantry, or bodies of both the 
latter deployed on the same line of battle”.134 
 Concerning the battle of the Mt. Haemus, Sekunda believes that this tactic 
proved successful because of the existence of large hoplite shields, while he doubts 
how this incident would be otherwise successful without large shields.135 Markle is of 
the same opinion, who supports that only the larger and strong hoplite shield could 
be appropriate to protect the bodies of the Macedonians from the wagons.  He goes 
on that in the early reign of Alexander his troops were not always armed with sarissa 
and his examples are from the Balkan campaign.136 Fox argues that the soldiers with 
the appropriate shields were ordered to lie down.137 English postulates that it is 
difficult for a Macedonian shield which is only 61 cm in diameter, in contrast with 
the hoplite shield of 100 cm diameter to protect the soldier. He continues by saying 
that either Arrian is wrong or this is a case whereby the heavy infantry is equipped 
with a hoplite panoply. He gave a counter argument by supporting that it would be 
difficult to use the sarissa in a narrow pass like this. Moreover, English claims that is 
not difficult to believe that in such conditions, hoplites shields would also be 
commandeered from the mercenary and allied forces, which were armed as the 
traditional heavy infantry. 138 
  Another interesting view indicates, that the pezhetairoi which were not so 
mobile were stationed in places where they had the opportunity to create some 
space and that these were the troops that avoided the cathode of the wagon. The 
troops that lied down were the Hypaspists, who were not equipped with sarissa and 
were armed with large shields. It would be difficult for the pezhetairoi with smaller 
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and less concave shields to protect themselves in that way, while it would be equally 
difficult to ground the sarissae by the whole phalanx.139 Doubts for this incident 
were also expressed by Snyder, who says that it’s not plausible to prevent the 
destruction of the carts with the shields. “Stones or a shallow embankment just 
above the positions, to make them bound outward would be more believable” he 
refers.140 
  I would personally rely on the passage of Polybius, who shows the topographical 
limitations of the Macedonian phalanx. The strongest argument is that the phalanx 
needed a flat terrain to work efficiently.141 Moreover, if we judge from the disastrous 
defeats of Philip V (Cynoscephalae 197 BC) and Perseus (Pydna 168 BC) we can 
recognize the strong disadvantage of the phalanx, on uneven ground.142 Here in the 
narrow uphill passage of Mt. Haemus, as it seems the sarissa- phalanx would have 
had some difficulties. It is illogical to think that Alexander would not be aware of the 
disadvantages of the phalanx. It seems more feasible that normal hoplite spears and 
shields were utilized. 
 Αll in all, this major battle presents Alexander, a very young man, with his first 
war tactical problem as king . He relied on his own capacity, because his most 
experience generals were on other missions.143 One of the features that characterize 
Alexander and differentiates him from other generals, is his talent to predict enemy 
plans in advance. Maybe it is the result of his great cleverness, but at times it 
appears as terribly intuitive.144 In his first leading to battle, Alexander presented not 
only his abilities as a military figure, but at the same time the supremacy of trained 
forces against brave but not so well-equipped troops which were numerous. A 
similar supremacy which Brasidas had shown with his forces at 424 BC.145 
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  Arrian inform us that with this stratagem, not one man perished, but we can 
surely imagine how many headaches had been created for the soldiers that had their 
heads under the wagons146 and how many broken bones, by the violent cathode of 
the wagons.147  I believe Arrian that Macedonians were “ἀβλαβεῖς” due to the fact 
that he is precise in the losses if we judge by the Lyginus battle testimony, but 
certainly some northern Hellenes may have suffered serious injuries. Ιf this occurred, 
it not referred to, due to the fact that is not so important in contrast with the 
smartness of the tactic, which saved the army of Alexander and of course it would 
steal some of the glory of the young commander. 
   After the battle, Alexander sent the booty back to the cities on the coast, and he 
appointed Lysania and Philota148 to this task. Here Bosworth refers that neither of 
them can be identified, as Lysanias never spoke again of the Asian campaign, while 
the name Philotas is very common to the Macedonian. Hence, this man is not the 
popular son of Parmenio.149 Here, we see that Alexander didn’t repeat the mistake 
of Philip who kept his booty and lost it. Alexander was present, back then in 339 B.C. 
and had learned a lesson. He sent the booty to the coast cities, from which they 
moved to Macedonia.150 
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b. Lyginus. 
 
 
 After his brilliant victory, Alexander marched over Haemus against the Triballians 
and he arrived to the river Lyginus. As you reach Haemus, it is only three days march 
from the Ister (Danube).151 The Lyginus is not a frequently noted location, in fact it is 
only referred to concerning the battle of Alexander against the Triballians. In 
addition, it cannot be located with certainty.152 When the king of Triballians, Syrmus 
learn about the march of Alexander, immediately he dispatched the women and the 
children of his people to an island on the Danube, called Peuce. There, some 
neighbors Thracians found shelter and Syrmus joined them while the fighting force 
of Triballians, were dispatched back to Lyginus river to face Alexander.153 
  About the island Peuce, Strabo also mentioned this incident in his account, 
information that was received from Ptolemy, while Arrian doesn’t enlighten us about 
the location. There was an island name Peuce on the Danube mouth as described by 
Eratosthenes and is mentioned frequently in later prose writing and verse. There are 
plenty of theories about the location of the island, although without definitive 
solution to this problem. For the sake of convenience, we can conclude that we 
cannot identity the island with any present islands of the Danube, due to the fact 
that the river has changed course in the last centuries, let alone millennia and many 
places have changed side of it.154 
 When Alexander was informed about the maneuver of the Triballians, he rapidly 
turned back and found them encamping. There, they formed lines near the glen by 
the river.155 The movement of the Triballians was smart enough. Syrmus knew that 
he had no advantage to face Alexander in front of his advance. So, he allowed his 
troops to hide in the woods, which they knew perfectly as the whole territory, while 
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the Macedonian army moved north unsuspectingly. Once the Macedonians had 
passed, the Triballians made a camp in the defensive position of the Lyginus River, 
directly across the Macedonians’ lines of supply and communication with the 
fatherland.156 With that maneuver, the Triballians reduced the choice of retreat for 
Alexander.157 
  The most interesting point is the reaction of Macedonians. The idea that the 
enemy was behind them and they were maybe trapped in a hostile region, created 
no panic or bustle in the troops. They just followed the command of their king and 
turned back to meet the enemy. The same maneuver occurred before the battle of 
Issus, and the reaction of Macedonians was exactly the same. So, from the early 
reign of Alexander we see the strong faith of the army towards the brand-new ruler 
and its strict discipline.158 
 Furthermore, I would like to add that the composure of the north Hellenes is not 
only based on their trust in Alexander, but also indicates that after the successful 
progress of Macedonia under Philip II, the several victorious battles, conquests and 
of course the achievements in the narrow passes of Haemus with Alexander, had as 
a result the creation of strong confidence in Macedonians, who recognized the 
superiority of their weapons and tactics. Their toils had dominated the entire Hellas 
and had won the rest of Hellenes in a significant battle (Chaeronea 338 BC). They 
had fought several times with Thracians, Illyrians, Triballians and Scythians and they 
had passed through crisis and panic with great kings just as Philip in 358 BC against 
Bardylis. All in all, this case seems that this was not enough to create agitation within 
the troops. 
 When Alexander turned back and found the enemy in a strong position, Arrian 
give us a testimony of battle, which emulates a game of chess. As we see the 
Triballians were protected in a wooden glen near the river. Alexander wanted to 
draw them out in the open, where the main part of his army could act. An attack in 
their defensive position would be disadvantage to the Macedonian troops. He knew 
that the Triballians were masters at ambuscades, but they had no discipline and they 
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could fall on an ambush. All he wanted was nice bait that would make the warlike 
Triballians come out.159 Alexander ordered the archers and slingers to fire the rivals, 
who were protected in the wooden glen. The Triballians accepted the blows and ran 
out of the forest glen with the aim of attacking the annoying archers and slingers 
who were unarmed. They fell in the trap of Alexander and they were on an open 
ground. When the enemy was out of its protection, Alexander ordered Philotas to 
lead the cavalry of Upper Macedonia and attack the right wing of the enemy when 
they had advanced farthest in their outward rush. Heracleides and Sopolis attacked 
the left wing with their cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis, while the other cavalry 
which was deployed in front of the phalanx, along with the phalanx onslaught fought 
against the center.160 (Image 5) 
 Here we are informed about a paradox in Alexander’s military life-career. In this 
battle, we find him stationed in the infantry. This was too rare outside of a siege 
situation.  We can only say according to the battles of his life, that he was not 
excited with the idea of fighting in the infantry due to the fact that in the future he 
positioned himself very frequently with the companion cavalry.161 Maybe in the 
Balkan campaign Alexander fought for the first time in his life in the formation of the 
phalanx.  
 Arrian informs us that the Triballians were not an easy enemy and the battle was 
quite equal until the moment the phalanx was engaged with the full force and the 
cavalry fell on them with the strength of the horses. Then, the enemy had no hope of 
fighting back and just retreated to save themselves in the glen of the river.162  
Apparently, Triballians were not equal to confront the heavily armed and perfectly 
trained Macedonian soldiers.163 Three thousand Triballians perished and few were 
captured alive, as the wood in front of the river was thick and the nightfall blocked 
the Macedonian pursuit. Arrian supports that according to Ptolemy, only 11 
equestrians died and 40 foot-soldiers.164 Dodge claims that the injured soldiers, 
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seldom referred to in ancient sources, while he says that “They averaged eight to 
twelve for one killed.”165 
 English suggests that at the time that the cavalry attacked the Triballians with the 
phalanx, the cavalry had already shot the masses of the enemy. We can assume that 
the cavalry had as its goal to enclose the Triballians and to prevent them from 
escaping before the infantry was in the fire of battle, thusly they waited for the 
infantry units to finish the battle.166 English refers that the reference to shooting is 
obviously with respect to projectile weapons. By that it doesn’t mean that there 
were horse archers, instead this is a mention for the presence of javelins, which 
were thrown from the horseback. English says that the companion cavalry was rarely 
equipped with another weapon than the cavalry sarissa, according to the reaction of 
Alexander when he lost his weapon in the battle of Granicus. Some javelins were 
maybe utilized here but not many.167 The main mission of the companions was to 
repeatedly annoy the Triballians until Alexander and the infantry would reach the 
enemy and were prepared to engage, at which point the cavalry would attack as 
normal and the enemy would be encircled and trapped. The cavalry would have 
been under the command of Alexander not to engage until Alexander arrived, he 
would not wish for one of his first conflicts to finish before his arrival, according to 
English.168 
 On the other hand, and more convincingly, Hammond suggests that the cavalry 
with javelins, who act like this, were the prodromoi. He supports his idea with the 
word ἀκοντισμῷ, i.e. these men first fought with javelins. The companion cavalry 
was already in the flanks of the Triballians and τὴν ἄλλην ἵππον (light cavalry) was in 
front of the phalanx. This cavalry fought at the start with javelins and engaged in 
close quarters. For every campaign it was necessary to combine the action of heavy 
and light cavalry. The flanks of the heavy cavalry in formation had to be guarded by 
light cavalry, something that happened in Gaugamela and in Hydaspes and the light 
cavalry had to act in hilly or rough ground as in the battle of Issus.169 
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 Whichever of the two theories which present strong arguments is the most 
correct or closer to the event that described by Arrian, the brilliant handling of both 
units i.e. infantry and cavalry, was the perfect strategy that was presented in this 
battle by Alexander. His great effort to push out the Triballians to open ground 
where he could defeat them was the smart strategy that actualized.170 
 On the third day after the conflict, Alexander approached the Ister which was the 
greatest river of Europe, traversing the greatest expanse of country and operating as 
an obstruction to the warlike tribes. There Alexander, at the mouth of the Ister 
found his warships, which came to join him from the Byzantium through the Black 
Sea.171 Errington claims that Byzantium operated as a base for the Macedonians in 
335 when Alexander crossed the Danube172 and maybe they offered him ships.173 On 
the other hand, Bosworth argues that, the ancient writer does not mean that the 
navy was from the Byzantines. The fleet maybe belonged to Macedonia. If this is 
true, the Byzantium will have served as a base for the fleet in the same manner as 
Chalcis in Euboea. The city had become an ally of Macedonia maybe after the 
Chaeronea.174 The navy must have been sent from Macedonia at the beginning of 
the campaign. 175 
 The fact that Alexander found his navy waiting for him in this place is another 
proof of his effective military planning. It seems that Alexander chose this place for 
meeting with the navy from the beginning, since the island that the Triballians and 
Thracians took refuge lay opposite.176 From that itis proved that Alexander’s aim was 
a total conquest of the enemy and an effort to push the frontier to the Danube.  
Before he set out, he ordered a unit of warships to meet him at this certain point as 
already mentioned in chapter 2.177 I tend to think, that this movement also reveals 
the confidence of Alexander that he would be victorious, and he will successfully 
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manage to reach the Danube. Another reason for the appearance of the fleet was 
the replenishment of the army.178 
  Alexander staffed the warships with archers and hoplites and directed it against 
the island that the Triballians and Thracians had found hope and refuge.  The 
Macedonian king tried to land his troops on the island but the defense of the 
Triballians and Thracians blocked the attack when the ships tried to land, the ships 
were without many men. Furthermore, the island was rigged for landing and the 
current of the river, as Arrian states “οἷα δὴ ἐς στενὸν συγκεκλεισμένον, ὀξὺ καὶ 
ἄπορον προσφέρεσθαι”.179 
 Alexander’s failure is due to the natural defenses of Peuce. He wouldn’t tolerate 
losing his men, while the Triballians were trapped in this refuge island, and 
Alexander could prevent their supplementation. Their surrender was a matter of 
time.180 Another paradox again in Balkan campaign is the defeat of Alexander by 
natural barrier. Here, we see Alexander giving up his effort, something unusual for 
the dynamics of his character. We can only assume that something like this would 
not happen later in Alexander’s life and of course he would not give up so easily.181 
  Ashley estimates that the effort to land troops at the Peuce was a strategical 
mistake. There were many obstacles in this operation, although Alexander insisted 
on achieving his plan. Nevertheless, he recognized his error and paused this 
attempt.182 
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C. Danube 
 
 
 Τhe impetuous river of Danube was for Thracians, like the Great wall for the 
Chinese,  a significant line of protection and defense. This harsh river destroyed 
Alexander’s plan to sail with his warships.183 When Alexander withdrew his warships, 
he noted that an army of Getae appeared on the opposite coast. Here Arrian 
explains that they had gathered with the intention to prevent him, if he tried to pass 
the Ister. The rival army, had large numbers such as circa 4.000 horsemen and more 
than 10.000-foot soldiers.  Soon, Alexander was captured by πόθος to advance 
beyond Ister.184 
 Who were these Getae?  The Getae were people of Thracian origin, who lived in 
the Danube valley, north of the Haemus range. According to Strabo the Getae lived 
on both sides of the lower Danube. Here in Arrian’s testimony we can see that on 
the north shore they overlapped with the Triballian region. Their fatherland was the 
central Walachian plain, in the main part of later Dacia.185 
 Alexander felt that these men were a challenge and this reflection gave him a 
reason for a demonstration, to display to Getae his capable army.186 Hammond 
believes that these Getae were a menace for the plan of Alexander to defeat the 
Triballians, due to the fact that the Getae would reinforce and supply the Triballians 
and Thracians of the island.187 Worthington supports that since it was harvest time, 
there were many corps and Alexander feared that these Getae would try to feed the 
population in Peuce.188 However, Worthington continues by saying that Getae in 
reality were not a true threat to Alexander as the Triballians in this situation and that 
there was a lot of distance between them and the men of Alexander. In addition, it 
would be difficult for them to support them with supplies on the Peuce.189 So why 
did Alexander attack? Maybe he was so active, but Philip’s memory seems to hunt 
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Alexander. Philip had been in the same region as Alexander at 335 BC, but he never 
crossed the Danube, Alexander here had an opportunity to outdo the achievements 
of his father.190 
 In this expedition Arrian for the first time presents the word pothos which 
appears often in his literary work for Alexander. This declares the strong desire to 
meet the unknown, unexplored, and to search the mysterious, something that 
Alexander did in his life.191  Alexander was influenced by Heracles and Achilles, who 
were the prototypes of inspiration in his life, and were considered as his ancestors. 
However, the provocative and palpable prototype for Alexander was his father 
Philip. Alexander made many efforts to be equal to Philip and later in his reign even 
to surpass him.192 
  In contrast with the scholars who love to write and compare Philip and 
Alexander, maybe there is another view about the passing of the Danube. Alexander 
would have known the account of Herodotus, who informs us about the failed 
campaign of Darius I beyond the Danube. Alexander would desire to surpass Darius I, 
to advance beyond Danube but with success, a crossing which would be a symbol of 
glory.193 However, except for desires and romantic thoughts for glory, we must think 
from another facet, a more realistic and pragmatic view. Alexander had no other 
option, besides retreating, which was impossible for him. If he would accomplish a 
successful invasion of the Getae land, which it would be a perfect demonstration of 
power, it would be closer to come to terms, with the trapped men of the Peuce and 
gain their surrender.194 
  Finally, we must not forget that the Getae if they appeared with the aim of 
preventing Alexander and since their presence was explained as a challenge, it would 
be a shame for the Macedonian king if he didn’t march to face them. It is true that 
Alexander had to appear as a dynamic expansionist leader, as the Macedonian 
soldiery was accustomed under Philip. The Macedonian kings rarely pass away in 
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deep old age or in their beds.195 Furthermore, he would probably be characterized as 
a coward who feared the Getae. It is always important to know that the king was the 
warlord of his kingdom.196 
 Whatever the reasons, Alexander was steadfast on his attack on the Getae who 
dared to appear in front of him.  He started the operation against them. He filled the 
leather tent covers with hay, which took them from the boats of the countryside 
which were made from single tree trunks, and passed across as many as he could 
from his forces. About 1.500 cavalry and 4.000 foot-soldiers.197 The passing of the 
soldiers happened at night and they debarked onto the rural area, with a deep 
cornfield and they weren’t revealed because of it, as they reached the bank.  Here 
we have an interesting passage, we see that in the narration of the Balkan campaign 
Arrian for the first time refers to the sarissa, in the events against the Getae.198 
ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἕω Ἀλέξανδρος διὰ τοῦ ληίου ἦγε, παραγγείλας τοῖς 
πεζοῖς πλαγίαις ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἐπικλίνοντας τὸν σῖτον οὕτω 
προάγειν ἐς τὰ οὐκ ἐργάσιμα. οἱ δὲ ἱππεῖς ἔστε μὲν διὰ τοῦ ληίου 
προῄει ἡ φάλαγξ ἐφείποντο.199 
  
 Here, Markle points out that this was the first time that the Macedonian phalanx 
with sarissa appeared. Accordingly in his mind, there is no true earlier evidence of 
this formation i.e. the infantry phalanx equipped with sarissa. Moreover, he argues 
that Arrian here cares to distinguish the new weapon from the shorter spear by 
referring to it.200 In fact it is true that Arrian referred to the weapons in the Balkan 
campaign. However, infrequently used the technical accurate term because he 
preferred the most general term of spear i.e. dory.201  
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 The army without being revealed, disembarked from the boats and Alexander 
gave orders to his troops to smooth down the corn with their sarissae which was 
held obliquely and to march to uncultivated ground. At this point, English refers that 
this happened because Alexander wanted to create the battlefield that would be 
appropriate for his army to fight.202 The cavalry followed the phalanx that advanced, 
and when they get out of the arable land, Alexander led the cavalry to the right wing 
while he sent Nicanor to lead the phalanx in rectangular formation.203 Its left flank 
was safe because of the river. Hammond says that this formation was utilized when 
the forces of the infantry had to deal with a stronger force of cavalry. In this 
situation, it was a logical movement, since the Getae and the Scythians were popular 
for their cavalry tactics while at this mission, the Getae outnumbered Macedonian 
cavalry by more than two to one.204 
 Nicanor was another son of Parmenio, the second one, who was the commander 
of the Hypaspists in Asia. The fact that here in the Balkan campaign he has the 
command of the phalanx is evidence that proves that he already occupied the 
office.205 
 The Getae couldn’t afford to resist the attack of the Macedonian cavalry, and 
they were surprised by the courage and achievement of Alexander who crossed the 
Danube in one night. Moreover, the balance and strength of the phalanx was very 
frightening and the charge of the cavalry disastrous. The terrorized Getae took flight 
to seek refuge in a city, about a parasang, i.e. 5-6 km. away from Danube. There they 
observed Alexander who promptly brought up his infantry along the river, with the 
aim of eliminating the threat of an encirclement by the Getae, with the cavalry in the 
front of the line. The Getae again abandoned the city, which did not possess great 
fortification while they carried their children and women on their horses and 
marched far away from the river unto the desert,206 i.e. Northern steppes.207 (Image 
6) 
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 It is not peculiar that the Getae opt to flight without giving a fight, when they saw 
the Macedonian army. And I’m pretty sure that we can safely support the use of the 
sarissa in this war against the Getae, based on Arrian. Here, I think it would be 
perfect to add the comment of Aemilius Paulus who was the winner of the battle of 
Pydna at 168 BC.  
μηδὲν ἑωρακέναι φοβερώτερον καὶ δεινότερον φάλαγγος Μακεδονικῆς.208 
 
 Although the Getae were characterized by Herodotus as Θρηίκων ἐόντες 
ἀνδρηιότατοι καὶ δικαιότατοι,209 they took flight upon the spectacle of the attacking 
Macedonian army. If the Macedonian phalanx terrorized the professional army of 
the Romans, imagine what terror it caused to a war-tribe like Getae. It is true that 
from its first appearance, the Macedonian phalanx was a forceful physical and 
psychological military field instrument.210 Here Alexander’s strongest weapon was 
the psychological effect that destroyed the courage of the Getae. They saw a man 
crossing the Danube in a single night with his army while he had already subjugated 
Thracians and the Triballians who were desperate on an isolated island. As Fuller 
says: “It can well be imagined that to the Triballians and other tribes it must have 
appeared to border on the miraculous, and in their eyes, exalt Alexander to a position 
little short of a god”.211 
  This incident is reminiscent of a similar extraordinary achievement in Asia. In the 
spring of 327 BC Alexander marched ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πέτραν, where many of 
the Sogdians had found refuge and Oxyartes had sent his family there. The rock was 
steep from every side, while the snow made it more impregnable and could offer 
water to the Sogdians who had plenty of supplies for withstanding a siege. The rock 
was so well protected that the barbarians said to Alexander that he must find 
winged soldiers if he desired to capture this fort. In the end, a small Macedonian 
team of climbers succeeded in occupying a precipitous, unprotected hill next to the 
barbarians. When the Sogdians saw the Macedonians on the hill, they were amazed 
and because they thought that there were more troops of Alexander and fully 
                                                          
208 Plb. 29.17. 
209Hdt. 4.93. 
210Gabriel 2010,65. 
211Fuller 1960,223. 
42 
 
armed, they surrendered. Arrian refers that they were terrorized at the view of those 
Macedonians on the hills.212 Ashley correctly refers that the Sogdians had larger 
forces, while the Macedonians were isolated from the rest of the army with no 
missile weapons, shields or armor, with no opportunity of retreat; if the Sogdians 
had attacked they would have killed them all. However, the Sogdians were so 
surprised by such daring action that they surrendered from their confusion.213 This 
incident in my opinion is identical to the one with the crossing of the Danube. 
  Back to the Danube, Alexander captured the city and took all the booty that the 
Getae left behind and sent it back to base via Meleager and Philip.214 These two men 
appeared as commanders of battalions at the Granicus and like Nicanor and Philotas 
may have been given their commands at the reign of Philip or short after his 
death.215 Alexander destroyed the city and made sacrifices to the Zeus Savior, 
Heracles and Ister himself on the shore of Danube for allowing the passage.216 This 
action characterized by Bosworth as “a gratuitous act of terrorism” to helpless 
people while proving that the Danube was not a safe defense for them.217 It seems 
that the crossing of Danube was a ruse that Alexander had read in military history. 
Xenophon, the Athenian had led the 10.000 Hellenes earlier in the fourth century 
through Mesopotamia, while he wrote down his march in his memoirs. From his 
experience from Euphrates, Xenophon presented how to cross the river on rafts of 
stuffed skins.218 
 English reports that the presence of Getae in a battle array at the bank of the 
river, indicates that the tribes had communicated with each other about the menace 
of Alexander. A united opposition by the tribes would be more dangerous for 
Alexander, in lieu of a separate rival that would fight alone against Macedonians.219 
Getae had concentrated with the goal of preventing a crossing and presumably to 
reinforce the Triballians, if there was an opportunity.220 The thought of the 
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communication of the tribes is confirmed by the fact that, although Arrian 
authenticates that Alexander was directed against Triballians and Illyrians (Arr. 
1.1.4), from the narrative of the campaign, we see extra fighting with some 
Thracians in Mt. Haemus and with the Getae. These three people i.e. autonomous 
Thracians and the merchant Thracians (Mt. Haemus), as and the Getae were not 
considered as a threat by the initial account of Arrian. Taking account this facet, we 
can support that maybe there was a strong riot in the Thrace among many tribes, 
although only Triballians referred to them. I tend to think that Arrian refers only the 
Triballians because he omits his account or because they were the most significant 
enemies of Macedonia due to the enmity there was among these people, since the 
period that Philip was king with the unfortunate battle for the Macedonians of 339 
ΒC. 
 With the total defeat of the Getae, Alexander had secured Danube as his frontier 
and there was no other rival tribe that would create any problem for him in the 
region.221 Alexander achieved his aim. Envoys came from Syrmus the king of 
Triballians and from other autonomous tribes, who lived near Ister and even more 
the Celts who lived on the Ionian Gulf. Here Alexander makes them all allies and 
friends. During this phase, there is a great incident according to Arrian and Strabo 
that is described concerning the Celts, which answers to Alexander’s question of 
what they feared the most? Celts replied that they feared, that the sky will fall upon 
them one day and not Alexander. After this reply, Alexander characterized them as 
ἀλαζόνες.222 
 The Celts were recognized as fearless warriors who dared to face the elements 
with great courage. It would be perfect if Alexander achieved a statement like this 
for his own propaganda i.e. that the fearless Getae, who weren’t terrorized by 
anything, feared Alexander.223  Personally I think that Alexander asked them because 
his achievements of the Balkan campaign may have been known to the vast region 
and Alexander gained popularity as a fearful enemy. In combination with his past 
victory over the Maedi at 340 B.C when he established a city in his own name, it is 
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perfect evidence which presents that Alexander was confident about himself, his 
military reputation and he desired to known whether the Celts shared the same 
opinion. This argument is supported by the fact that Alexander call them ἀλαζόνες 
because they didn’t fear his power, which Alexander was sure that he had. Maybe 
this high level of confidence of Alexander, was a result of some divine marks. First, 
the reply of Pythia at Delphi. Pythia called Alexander ἀνίκητος, this reply remained in 
Alexander’s thoughts.224. Secondly, in the beginning of the campaign, we hear about 
a sacrifice to Dionysus at the god’s sanctuary at Crestonia in northeast Macedonia, 
where the flames reached an unusual height. Alexander informed that this divine 
sign indicated that he would be victorious.225 This passage reveals the nature of 
Alexander being ambitious and full of confidence, even from his early reign. 
 The achievement and the trepidation of Alexander in Thrace and in the Danube, 
was so great that for half a century no Thracian or Celt dared to attack Macedonia.226 
Macedonia with its great victory had gained a new role that the other Hellenes 
couldn’t understand during that time. Having subjugated the Balkans, Macedonia 
acted as a bulwark against the dangerous tribes of Europe, while a strong 
Macedonian state secured the Hellenic city life in the south. As Fox states “The 
European conquests of Philip and Alexander belonged to a wider perspective, 
essential to the safety, if not the freedom, of Greece”.227 
 Moreover, Alexander received some troops from the Triballians.228 We can 
estimate that the Triballians were subordinated under the Macedonians, after their 
defeat by Alexander, and it was necessary for them to support the Macedonian war 
against Darrius III, with their contribution.229 The Triballians remained allies of 
Alexander from then on. Alexander had proven that he was capable as an avenger of 
his father and as king in the battlefield and in diplomacy.230 
 Although, I emphasized the inferiority of the Balkan tribes; for example, the 
Thracian infantry troops were generally defeated when they were in close contact 
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battle against a disciplined heavy infantry.231 However, we must underline the 
success of Alexander too. According to Herodotus, the Thracians were the biggest 
nation in the world, next to the Indians and if they united under one ruler, they 
would be the most powerful nation in the world, although they didn’t unite and for 
this reason they remained weak.232 This view related with the comment of Justin 
who attests that if the Illyrians, Thracians, Dardanians, and other barbarous nations 
united, it would be impossible to confront them.233 The first campaign of Alexander 
as king against the northern tribes, clearly presented, the old truism, already known 
from the antiquity, i.e. that Alexander was a strategic and tactical genius.234 Here we 
see, the unusual forcefulness, vitality, military charisma and ability of the young king 
who reached the Danube alone.235 
 For four months Alexander was trying to restore the authority that his father had 
imposed with several campaigns in winter and summer. The kingdoms of 
Macedonians in the Balkans were different in contrast with that of Athens as a 
paradigm in the Aegean area. The conquered tribes continued to govern themselves 
using their own laws and customs and retained their own army. There was no attest 
of any kind of enforcement of a political system of rule e.g. democracy or oligarchy 
which would create a turmoil, whilst there is no occupation by the new rulers, such 
as garrisons. Instead each ethnos retained its own traditions and the way they lived 
before they fought with Macedonia.236 The only demands of the Macedonians were 
a tribute, probably a tenth of the production, the supply of the army with troops and 
labor on demand and finally the acceptance of the Macedonian foreign policy. The 
old system of civil tribal wars and the idea of living by pillage was abandoned and 
replaced by peace and prosperity in which the agrarian workers would play an 
important role.237 
 Philip had established significant cities in appropriate places and stopped the 
unruly manners of the Thracians. In the new towns that Philip established, with the 
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largest the Philippopolis (Plovdiv) the population was mixed with Macedonians and 
other Hellenes and the elite of the local people. The aim of the new towns was to 
boost agriculture and trade and the diffusion of the Hellenic language for 
administrative purposes.238 The Hellenic city states of the Thracian coast entered the 
alliance of Philip and then of Alexander. Alexander ruled both sides of the 
Hellespont, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus. The fleet of Macedonia and the 
Hellenic community had achieved the sea control in these waters and in the Black 
sea and they could travel to the Danube. They had the chance to stop piracy and to 
protect the cities there, against the local peoples. The result of all this change was a 
quick expansion of trade exchange and maritime trade. Both kings, father and son 
used the rich mineral resources of Thrace as subordinate region and they issued a 
coinage which was released in central Europe. The Hellenic city states profited from 
the strengthening of the trade and from the safety of the corn route from the Black 
sea, on which Athens and many other cities depended.239 
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    Chapter III 
 
                          The Illyrian threat 
 
οἱ δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἐθαύμαζον τήν τε ὀξύτητα ὁρῶντες καὶ τὸν κόσμον 
τῶν δρωμένων: τότε δὲ προσάγοντας ἤδη τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀλέξανδρον 
οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ λείπουσι τοὺς πρώτους λόφους. (Arr. An. 
1.6.3) 
 
   a. Cleitus and Glaukias 
 
  
 After his achievements and successes with the Thracians, Triballians and Getae, 
Alexander marched towards the Agrianians and Paeonians.240 This is towards the 
Upper Strymon valley and the terrain amid that valley and the upper Vardar (Axios) 
Valley.241The Agrianians for affairs of administration were included in the north-
western area which was administered by Pella and not Thrace. The Paeonians were 
under the dominion of Macedonia from the reign of Philip and were consolidated in 
Macedonia. Their king Lyppeius continued to issue his regent coinage next to the 
coinage of Philip and Alexander and his royal house enjoyed prestige. The squadron 
of Paeonian cavalry was drafted from the Paeonian elite as an ethnic group inside 
the kingdom.242 
 Here, Hammond suggests that Alexander was marching against the Illyrians and 
the information about their revolt had arrived.243 Moreover, Dodge seems to share 
the same opinion of Hammond due to the fact that he mentions “Early in the spring 
he (Alexander) started along the route with the purpose of settling the troubles at the 
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Danube and afterward those on the Illyrian borders once for all”.244 If we follow this 
thought, we can conclude that Alexander knew from the beginning about their 
threat as  Dodge , Hammond and Arrian suggest in contrast with Bosworth and many 
scholars who believe, that the Illyrians at that time revolted, declaring that 
Alexander had no plan to attack them from the beginning.245 According to Bosworth, 
Arrian is talking about the Triballians and Illyrians, albeit there is ambiguity about 
which Illyrians Alexander intended to attack.  Maybe they were not the people of the 
north-west since Alexander at the end of the Danube campaign, learned about their 
rebellion. Furthermore, they were not the Autariatae, an Illyrian tribe west to 
Triballians because Alexander did not know their existence before 335. So, Bosworth 
infers that, Arrian phrases ἐς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριούς (Arr. An. 1.1.4) are possibly 
inexact. Ptolemy may have spoken about a general turmoil in the north with the 
Illyrians and Triballians and Arrian may have deduced wrongly that they were 
Illyrians and Triballians who were referenced in that revolt.246 
  At this point, a Ptolemaic fragment, a papyrus which was found from Hogarth at 
Rifen in 1906/1907 A.D. and dated to second and first century BC, offers us a 
historical narrative of the Balkan campaign of Alexander from 335 BC. which can 
help.247(Image 7)In the fragment, a new face appears “Korragos” one of Alexander’s 
friends, conceivable Hetairos, who ordered to guard the Illyrian frontiers with some 
troops. This Korragos or Corrhagus is the son of Menoitas.248 
 In this papyrus, there is a citation of an expedition to Eordaia and Elimeia (ll 13.-
14) (image 8) which could probably reveal the general turmoil in these regions 
during the early reign of Alexander. (Diod. 17.3.5, Plut. Alex. 11). Arrian rapidly 
proceeds to the main events of the campaign of Alexander against the Thracians and 
not one of these authors refers to the protective measures that Alexander took to 
control these circumstances.249 Korragos was responsible for signaling the coming 
hazard by sending constant messages to the soldiery, which would march with 
Alexander to the Thracian expedition. This action indicates a military intelligent 
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system, which allowed him to receive messages while he was on the march. The 
appearance of the messengers in Arrian (1.5.1) with the news of the revolt of the 
Illyrian kings, indicates how this intelligent system worked. From the fragments of 
the papyri, it seems that his mission took place before the revolt of the Illyrians and 
the upcoming campaign of Alexander in Illyria. This interpretation is confirmed with 
the historical narrative of Arrian.250 On this matter Arrian maybe is truly correct by 
declaring that the Illyrians and the Triballians were restless. (Image 7) 
  So, while Alexander and his army was on the way, messengers came and 
announced to him that Cleitus son of Bardylis had revolted and he had as ally 
Glaukias the king of Taulantians. The bad news didn’t end here, a third force 
appeared in the game and it was that the Autariatae were willing to attack 
Alexander, while he was marching.251  Cleitus according to most of the scholars was 
the son of the well-known enemy of Macedonia, Bardylis, who had fought against 
Philip II in 358 B.C. On the other hand, Hammond supports that this Cleitus is the son 
of Bardylis II, so Cleitus is the grandson of the well-known Bardylis.252 It is not 
authenticated as to which branch of the Illyrians the Bardylis ruled, but it is probably 
the Dardanians253 , a tribe north of Macedonia straddling the significant region amid 
the Drin and the Erigon.254 Since the Taulantians and Autariatae are referred to in 
Arrian’s narrative, we can consider that Cleitus’ troops were the great tribe of 
Dardanians.255 The history of this tribe is strongly connected with Macedonia, and 
the only relationship between these two nations was war; as in the Dardanians’ 
onslaught on Macedonia or the Macedonian kings marched into Dardania to impose 
their authority. Friendship never existed amid the two nations.256 
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 The Taulantians, were in the inland of Epidamnus, and Epidamnus remained their 
significant area through the whole of antiquity. In 335 BC their personal benefit was 
to be federated with the Dardanians against the federated kingdoms of Molossia and 
Macedonia.257 
  The third force the Autariatae are described by Strabo as one of the three most 
forceful Illyrian tribes. Their terrain bordered on Paeonia like that of the Dardanians 
and reached as far as the Bessi of the Haemus. According to Arrian’s testimony, we 
can see that the Autariatae were close to the Agrianians because Langarus made an 
invasion easily, but also, we can see that they were not under the sway of 
Macedonia. Here Bosworth continues by saying that Alexander had no idea about 
their existence. Bosworth locates their country adjacent to the Nis and Morava 
rivers. Finally, we can mention that their region stretched a great distance west, 
since they were also certified as neighbors of the Ardiaei of the Adriatic coast.258 
Moreover, Hammond says that the Autariatae were an autonomous tribe which had 
been defeated by Philip but they didn’t lose their independence.259 
  It is presumable that the forces of Cleitus and Glaukias intended to attack 
western Macedonia while Alexander was far away, simultaneously the crucial 
appearance of Autariatae, aimed to hinder Alexander on his return.260 The situation 
warned Alexander that most of Illyria would soon be in revolt and the western 
border of Macedonian would be invaded. Alexander knew that if he wanted to 
exterminate this threat he had to act immediately.261 English points out, that an 
Illyrian threat was a significant and delicate issue, which symbolized a strong enmity 
between the two peoples, if we judge according to the wars between Macedonia 
and Illyria.262 The danger was vast, the Illyrians had united forces which would direct 
them against western Macedonia for devastation, something that was their 
traditional tactic.263 
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 At this point, English marks that this was probably a mistaken oversight by 
Alexander who had left his homeland with no protection, for the reasons we already 
mention in chapter 2. Alexander had to act quickly before the Illyrian threat destroys 
him, and all his conquests in Thrace and Hellas would try to revolt again.264 On the 
other hand, Sarantis supports that when Alexander left his homeland for Thrace and 
Danube, he left Pella with great forces under Antipater for the internal order and the 
protection of the frontiers. Sarantis declares that he could appoint the Illyrian threat 
to Antipater, something that Philip would have done. Nevertheless, Alexander was a 
totally different character in contrast with his father and acted immediately.265 
 We cannot know how many men were left in Macedonia, while Alexander was in 
Balkans, albeit we are sure that the main army was absent from its fatherland. We 
must not forget that there was a Macedonian force in Asia Minor too, with 
Parmenio.266 However, Hammond-Walbank suggests that Alexander left substantial 
forces under Antipater in Macedonia.267 Furthermore, I would like to add that the 
campaign of 335 BC was a secure movement by itself, the attack of Alexander to his 
north neighbors until Danube was a protective measure.  Personally, I tend to think 
that his defeated ex rivals like Triballians, Thracians and Getae would not have had 
time to reorganize their troops and to march against Alexander, after their 
humiliating defeats. By that I mean, that there was not any possible danger at least 
from Thrace, while in Hellas the enmity to Macedonian sway had not yet been 
provoked. 
 At that point Laggarus, king of Agrianians makes his appearance, who from the 
reign of Philip had declared his friendship to Alexander, and he appeared in 335 BC 
in close alliance with his hypaspists. He listened to the questions of Alexander about 
the Autariatae and replied that he must not be concerned about them, because they 
are the most ἀπολεμωτάτους to the region. So, on the command of Alexander, 
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Laggarus was heading against the Autariatae, fought with them and exempted 
Alexander from their hostility.268 
 Laggarus was honored with great gifts by Alexander, and he accepted Cynnane, 
the sister of Alexander, daughter of Philip with the Illyrian princess Audata,269 for 
marriage. Although, this marriage never occurred, because Laggarus passed away 
due to an illness.270 Another fact that indicates his success was the silence of 
Autariatae, who didn’t create any problems again, when Alexander was in Asia.271 
The action of Laggarus was extremely significant, because he secured Alexander’s 
flank for this march. Laggarus directed the army west against the Autariatae, with 
the aim of preventing any attack on the Macedonian column, while Alexander was 
marching.272 That period, Autariatae did not seem to be a strong military force and 
thusly, Laggarus easily took control of them.273 However, later they become a great 
military power, as we know from Strabo, and from the account of Diodorus who 
referred to their military action.274 
 Bosworth argues, that the appearance of Laggarus was connected to the only 
information we have about the Agrianians, under the sway of Philip. Agrianians were 
an essential military force, which accompanied Alexander from the beginning of his 
reign, while they were also significant in the reign of Philip. Bosworth continues his 
reflection by arguing that, we don’t know when these people became subjects of 
Philip and we only know that when Agis king of the Paeonians died in 358, Philip 
attacked their kingdom and forced the Paeonians to come under his authority. 
Bosworth assumes that at this subjugation maybe included and the Agrianians, and 
Laggarus were Agis’ successor.275 However, this thought comes in contrast with 
Hammond, who suggests that Luppeius was the king of the Paeonians. 
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 The young king continued his march, heading along the river Erigon, moving 
against the city Pellion which was occupied by Cleitus, because it was the most 
fortressed city of the area. When Alexander reached the city, he encamped near the 
river Eordaicus and was keen to attack the city the next day.276 
 It is true that in Arrian’s testimony there is a lot of ambiguity about the location 
of the city of Pellion and its vicinity.277 Leake has pointed out that Pellion was below 
the pass in the proximity of Pliassa. Grote immediately accepted the location of the 
city.278Droysen places Pellion in the vicinity of Pliassa too.279 Moreover, Hammond 
suggests that the Gorice is the ancient city of Pellion.280 On the other hand, Sarantis 
points out that the place that Alexander fought with Illyrians was located in the 
modern-day hills Βregou -I- Kersis southwest of the village Gκolobart.281 While 
Bosworth supports that the Illyrians may have occupied a site inside Macedonia and 
more specifically in modern Florina in Lyncestis, close to the Macedonian border 
near to Eordaea and the western city of Edessa.282Finally, in 2003, Winnifrith 
mentioned Zvezde, and it connects it to Arrian’s text.283 The present paper follows 
the topographical survey of N.G.L. Hammond. 
 Except for the account of Arrian, the other sources (Diod. Plut. Strab.) cannot 
help us with the location of Pellion. Although, if the Illyrian threat was in Lyncus, as 
Bosworth suggests, I thought that the sources would have spoken about an Illyrian 
invasion. When, Perdiccas III died, the Illyrians had occupied many cities in Upper 
Macedonia and Philip was the man who removed the Illyrian shadow from entire 
Macedonia.284 If after Philip’s death we had a new invasion, it would be an extremely 
significant event for the sources to mention. That Alexander faced an invasion and 
he would be forced to defend his kingdom, while he was in a campaign far away. 
Conversely, we must not forget that Alexander executed the Lyncestian princes, and 
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some local turmoil against him would be logical in these terrains.285 But and if a 
turmoil existed and the Illyrians came down to unite with the disenchanted 
Lyncestians, the sources would never omit that historical detail. 
 For the route that Alexander followed for Pellion, Hammond states that 
“Alexander took the quickest route to western Macedonia via Sofia, Kjustendi 
(ancient Pataulia), Kratovo(Tranupara) and Strip (Astibus), and then from the upper 
Vardar valley via Gradsko and Prilep into Pelagonia and Lyncus, the two cantons in 
which the river Erigon (the Cerna Reka) gathers its headwaters. From Lyncus the 
most direct route to Pelion was via Florina, Pisodherion, Kariai and the Gryke e Ujkut. 
It is possible that Alexander took this route; but it is more likely that he marched via 
Vatokhorion and Bilisht to cover the routes of entry into Orestis, because he could not 
have known whether Cleitus and Glaucias were ahead of him on their way into 
Macedonia”.286Of course we realize that Arrian omits to give details and information 
about a huge distance like this.287 
 The troops of Cleitus occupied the mountains around the city, which were high 
and thickly wooded. These forces in the perfect strategic points were prepared to 
attack to Macedonians from all sides, if they attempted the onslaught against the 
city.288 Alexander decided to camp close to the River Devoll for logical reasons, i.e. to 
have some protection and to provide his men and horses with water. He was not so 
close to Pellion. Thusly, we can station him at the junction of Devoll with the old 
river of Ventrok which probably is the Eordaicus. 
  Cleitus came south via Tetovo and Kitsevo to the head of the Lake Ochrid and 
then directed along one or the other side of the lake to the Tsangon Pass and Pellion. 
His occupation in Pellion provides benefits for him as a base for invasions in 
Macedonia land.289 Concerning the occupation of the surrounding mountains and 
hills, Hammond suggests that is a hyperbole to support that Alexander’s army was 
exposed by the men of Cleitus from each side since Alexander needed a free route to 
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his camp and because from the narrative it appeared that his army acted in a large 
plain.290 
 English suggests that, Cleitus maybe didn’t have such large forces to surround the 
Macedonians on every side, and of course the troops which were stationed in the 
mountains would not be visible in that region immediately upon Alexander’s arrival 
on the flatland, otherwise Alexander would have realized that he was moving into an 
ambush. The Illyrians must have had some distance and their action would have 
started with a prearranged signal.291 
 When Alexander arrived in the flatland, the surrounding forces appeared, and 
the Macedonians realized in how difficult position they were. Alexander knew that 
his father had lost a battle against Onomarchus of Phocis under similar 
circumstances, in a horseshoe-shaped gorge, when Onomarchus released his 
catapults and missile weapons upon Philip from above.292 Although, Ashley attests 
that the Illyrian infantry opted to abate the power of their rivals with missile fires, 
fighting from a distance instead of hand to hand combats.293 However, In this case, 
the Illyrians didn’t have such equipment, otherwise the situation would have been 
extremely difficult for Alexander.294 
 We can easily guess how difficult the night might have been for Macedonians. As 
it was logical, Alexander needed to keep his troops under arms as protecting 
measure for a night assault. Cleitus had missed opportunities to destroy the 
Macedonian army. He did not have missile weapons at the time that he needed 
them to create a vast turmoil with his ambush. Secondly, he didn’t act at night, he 
had armies from three sides that could onslaught the Macedonians. We must not 
forget that the fact that Alexander retained his troops with weapon means that they 
were tired and this was an advantage for Cleitus, who was determined to act the 
next day in the morning,295 
 At that time, Glaukias had not arrived in Pellion with his troops and Cleitus was 
alone. The next day Alexander moved against the city. The Illyrians offered sacrifices 
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by slaying three young boys, three young girls and three black rams and they 
assaulted the Macedonians. When they entered in the fire of battle they withdrew 
from the battlefield immediately, although they had occupied strong defensive 
positions, the success of Macedonians was for once so fast and dynamic that they 
found the dead corpses lying on the ground of the youths and animals. That day 
Alexander forced the Illyrians to seek refuge in the city. Alexander’s plan was to build 
a wall around the city with the aim of blocking them. The next day Glaukias arrived 
with strong forces.296 
 Sarantis mentions that the forces of the Illyrians were not appropriate for a siege 
struggle. When Cleitus conquered the Pellion, he did not prepare for defense and for 
a siege but he stationed the largest part of his troops outside of the city with the 
thought, that when he repelled the attack of Alexander, he would reinforce his 
position and attack Alexander from several directions.297 From the battle’s result, we 
can easily understand that the rapid retreat of Cleitus indicates his low confidence in 
his troops. Moreover, Glaukias hadn’t yet arrived and Cleitus opted for defense. 
With that option, he destroyed his initial advantage i.e. of surrounding the 
Macedonians.298 
  Alexander’s campaign in Pellion is interesting and due to the factor of the speed 
of the king. Here we see that his arrival was so fast, that the forces of the Illyrians 
couldn’t unite. Glaukias came after Alexander at the field, although he had organized 
this plan with Cleitus before Alexander marched on Pellion.299 Alexander’s idea 
about circumvallation, (περιτειχισμῷ) is truly curious, according to Hammond, since 
Alexander knew that Glaukias was on his way and would unite forces with Cleitus 
thus would create a serious nuisance to Alexander’s supplementation as long as the 
wall was under construction. It would seem more logical if Alexander had sacked the 
city.300 Hammond-Walbank, refers that Alexander decided to build the wall around 
the city because with this action he would blockade the city and his forces could 
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operate inside its own defenses. Having established his authority in the flatland over 
the Dardanians of the heights, he would have the chance to gather supplies and 
obtain pasture in the flatland of Poloske.301 
 Here English suggests that Alexander had no another choice except from the 
circumvallation of the town. He points out that before Alexander’s lifetime, the 
defenders in sieges always had the advantage. This occurred since there was an 
ellipse of effective siege equipment, while catapults were a fresh discovery. The 
catapults with stones first introduced in 334 BC, while the attackers-besiegers had 
some limits to their actions, as to use ladders and rams or to try to gain betrayal 
from the defenders of the city. English continues by saying that Alexander’s forces 
out of Pellion were not so large and the limited siege train was not available for 
Alexander now. Furthermore, English adds that Alexander didn’t have some high 
skills in guile and cunning as his father, which would offer him the surrender of the 
town. So, Alexander had only one alternative, the blockade of Pellion.302 
  Sarantis supports that Alexander started the circumvallation with the aim of 
preventing the Illyrians from escaping from the fortress, during the night. The next 
day he would start his siege.303 The appearance of Glaukias proved, that the idea of 
circumvallation could not be undertaken. Moreover, the supplementation started to 
come under danger and the enemy was not so foolish as to offer a battle to 
Alexander on his own ground. They were aware that their advantage was to make 
Macedonians hungry or to force them to move, while the Illyrians were willing to 
assault them on their move. Furthermore, they knew that when Alexander would be 
forced to move he would immediately lose his strong advantage. Alexander had 
defeated the troops of Cleitus who found refuge inside the town, so Alexander’s 
presence was responsible for the isolation inside the town, of the strongest troops of 
Cleitus. This was precisely Alexander’s advantage.304 
 Green admits that the circumvallation of Pellion was a tactical mistake, due to 
the fact that Alexander had no time to waste to starve the forces of Cleitus. 
Moreover, according to Green, Alexander’s troops were not enough and they 
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couldn’t offer him the opportunity to occupy the well defended city by storm, with 
the threat of Glaukia’s appearance.305 On the other hand, Ashley argues that Pellion 
“was only lightly held at the time” and Alexander did not assault the city because the 
siege machines didn’t follow the army during that phase. He refers that Alexander 
would fear that without his siege train he would suffer many casualties. Moreover, 
he believes too, that this was a tactical error, especially at that moment where time 
was significant and without his engines he had to at least attack the city.306 
  English emphasizes that, if Alexander knew of the advent of Glaukias, then his 
choice of advancing and the plan of circumvallation would be a tactical mistake. He 
suggests that a better solution would have been a retreat through the pass and to 
prepare for another strategy. In contrast, English states that if Alexander didn’t know 
about the influx of Glaukias, this is an example of the poor quality of military 
information in antiquity; meaning that a large force was approaching nearby and its 
arrival on the battlefield was completely unknown to Alexander.307 
 Ι thought that in this phase, we are very unfair with Alexander’s action. Firstly, I 
found it impossible to believe that Alexander didn’t know or at least didn’t predict 
the coming of Glaukias since he had been informed that these two powers had 
united and since the station of Cleitus towards Pellion was a strong clue, which 
emphasized that he stayed on a perfect base for hostile movements towards 
Macedonia. Furthermore, here we are dealing with Alexander, a person who always 
had alternatives thanks to his charisma to predict the movements and the intentions 
of his rivals. Something that he also did in Mt. Haemus. I tend to think that with the 
circumvallation Alexander aimed to block Cleitus and to isolate him and then to face 
Glaukia alone.308 By that I mean, that Alexander desired to separate the forces of his 
enemies. Maybe Alexander thought that he had some time to block the city, but 
Glaukia’s arrival showed that he didn’t succeed in finishing his plan in time. 
Alexander wanted to have time and rapidity at his own advantage. This is the reason 
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why he chose this lightning battle route, he appeared to Cleitus earlier than Glaukias. 
He was aiming to finish Cleitus and if Cleitus didn’t offer him a straight and fair 
battle, he wanted to isolate him with the περιτειχισμῷ and then to direct his army 
against Glaukia, while Cleitus and his troops would watch from inside the city walls, 
helpless to act. In this point we have to add that, another reason justifying 
Alexander's apathy towards the arrival of the Glaukias and his insistence on the 
circumvallation plan, may be because Alexander was not afraid of the Illyrian ruler's 
army, considering his Macedonian powers as being far superior. 
  When Glaukias arrived, Alexander stopped the idea of taking the city, due to the 
fact that many men had taken refuge inside Pellion and Glaukias would attack 
Alexander if he charged the wall.309 Alexander decided to send Philotas with many 
horsemen and all the baggage animals from the camp, with the aim of obtaining 
food. When Glaukias was informed about the movement of Alexander, he was 
determined to prevent the supplementation and occupied the heights around the 
region, where the men of Philotas would obtain food.  Afterwards, when Alexander 
was informed that the mission of Philotas was in danger, he acted immediately by 
taking with him his hypaspists, archers, Agrianians and four hundred equestrians. 
The rest of the army, stayed on, near the city, to prevent a union of Cleitus and 
Glaukias troops. When Glaukias saw Alexander with his army, he abandoned his 
plan, Philotas and his men returned to camp with safety.310  
   Here as it is logical, the fact that Alexander learned about the danger of his forage 
mission, (ἀπηγγέλθη αὐτῷ) indicates the effectiveness of the intelligence system.311 
Μoreover, Arrian provides us with this information: καὶ ὁ Γλαυκίας μαθὼν τὴν ὁρμὴν 
τῶν ἀμφὶ Φιλώταν ἐξελαύνει ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, which declares that maybe and the 
Illyrians or more specific the Illyrian Glaukias had established an intelligent system 
too.312 
 It seems that Glaukias took only a part of his army in the mission against Philotas 
while his main part of the army remained in the mountains over Pellion. These were 
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the forces which Alexander didn’t want to federate with the troops of Cleitus.313 
Alexander sought to save his men and he took the troops of the army with him 
which were the most appropriate to fight the enemy on a rough terrain.314 The 
mission for supplementation was a risky one. Glaukias had some opportunities here 
that he did not handle so well. To begin with, Alexander would probably have 
needed some hours to arrive to the flatland, which was 8km315 far away from Pellion. 
This time span was enough for Glaukias to engage with Macedonians and to create 
some problems for them. Secondly, here there is again the failure of Glaukias and 
Cleitus to attack the remaining army of Alexander to Pellion, many special forces 
were with Alexander who was far away. It would be a chaotic charge from in front 
and the rear by the Illyrians to the Macedonians who would have had to react 
without the leadership of Alexander.316 
 After the rescue of the food expedition, Arrian give us a strong passage which 
testifies how difficult and desperate Alexander’s position was. 
ἐδόκουν δ᾽ ἔτι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν δυσχωρίᾳ ἀπειληφέναι οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν 
Κλεῖτον καὶ Γλαυκίαν: τά τε γὰρ ὄρη τὰ ὑπερδέξια κατεῖχον πολλοῖς μὲν 
ἱππεῦσι, πολλοῖς δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς καὶ σφενδονήταις καὶ ὁπλίταις δὲ οὐκ 
ὀλίγοις, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει κατειλημμένοι προσκείσεσθαι 
ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἤμελλον: τά τε χωρία δι᾽ ὧν ἡ πάροδος ἦν τῷ 
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ στενὰ καὶ ὑλώδη ἐφαίνετο, τῇ μὲν πρὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ 
ἀπειργόμενα, τῇ δὲ ὄρος ὑπερύψηλον ἦν καὶ κρημνοὶ πρὸς τοῦ ὄρους, 
ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ἀσπίδων ἂν τῷ στρατεύματι ἡ πάροδος 
ἐγένετο317 
  In this passage, we see the variety of the large number of troops of Illyrians, the 
occupation of strategic positions by the rivals and the terrain limitations that 
Alexander faced. Hammond estimates that Cleitus and Glaukias may have gathered 
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circa 50.000 troops.318 The professor suggests that the Gryke e Ujkut pass matches 
Arrian’s description (πάροδος).319 
 Τhrough the Gryke e Ujkut, Alexander would enter into the Macedonian land and  
would have open communications lines with Prespa basin and Lyncus. Certainly, he 
would gain an advantage because he would hold the Gryke e Ujkut passage against 
Illyrians.320 Here the tactical problem for the young king was how to lead his troops 
through this narrow route in front of his rivals and with the troops of the Pellion 
probably on his heels.321 
 Arrian describes the stratagem that Alexander followed. Alexander arrayed the 
phalanx in a formation of 120 men deep in each file and he stationed 200 horsemen 
on each wing. He ordered them to stay silent and to obey his commands 
immediately.  Arrian here quotes the orders of Alexander for the infantry. To raise 
their pikes upright, then to put them in the position of attack at the word of 
command, and to swing the pikes coordinated to the right and then to the left. He 
moved the phalanx forward with rapidity and then changed direction now to one 
flank and now to the other. Thus, he deployed and maneuvered it in many difficult 
formations very quickly, and making a kind of wedge on the left part of the phalanx 
whereby he assaulted the enemies. The Illyrians watched this and they were 
impressed from the concerted maneuvers of the perfectly trained army. They 
immediately abandoned the first hills without a fight.322 Alexander had ordered the 
Macedonians to shout with their war-cry and to clash the pikes to their shields, this 
action provoked extreme terror in the Taulantians who retreated and headed back 
to Pellion.323 
 The sarissae of the infantry were held vertical until the moment of clash, when 
the first rows brought their sarissae into horizontal position. Προβολή is the 
technical term for the sarissae in this position, i.e. battle position and Plutarch refers 
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to it with the formation (συνασπισμός) as the basic feature of the Macedonian 
phalanx. (Flamininus 8,4, Philopoemen 9.4).324 
 The Illyrians watched this entire ruse from the Pellion and from the surrounding 
hills that were occupied, the Veljak, Tren, Trajan, Shpile and Shkoze. The foe was 
incapable of guessing where Alexander would strike or if he planned to strike. 
Epaminondas, who was considered as the forerunner of the Macedonian 
commanders, had a similar result in the flatland south of Mantinea in 362 B.C. In that 
case, Epaminondas had suddenly attacked with a massed left, which emulated the 
bow of a ship. Something that is strongly similar with Alexander’s movement here. 
325 
 Markle supports that the maneuvers of the phalanx at this event cannot occur 
with large lances as long as eighteen feet in length, and that a soldier cannot clash 
the long heavy pike with success i.e. the sarissa which was held with both hands and 
the small Macedonian shield hanging around the neck. Moreover, Markle refers very 
cogently the reference of Arrian to spears and not to sarissae.326 Bosworth states 
that, (τοῖς δόρασι δουπῆσαι) Alexander commanded the same order at Gaugamela 
and it must have been a habitual part of the phalanx in the offence. The small shield 
was fastened over the shoulder. In the commencement of the battle, it was drawn 
down the arm so that it could be shaken against the sarissa, while they moved 
forward. It was likely that they held the weapon fixed with the left hand, while the 
right handled the shield.327 On the other hand, Markle refers in his footnotes to 
Bosworth’s opinion, that “A.B. Bosworth believes that it would be possible to beat 
with the shield held in the right hand against the sarissa supported by the left hand, 
but that method is not what is described in the text of Arrian (Anab.1 6.3) nor by 
Diodorus (17.57.6, 58.3) as happening at Gaugamela. In the former case τοῖς δόρασι 
and in the latter ταις σαρισσαις are both clearly instrumental datives; thus, the 
shields are made to resound by being hit with the spears and lances”.328 
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 Whatever the weapon of the Phalangite’s was, sarissa (something that was 
believed of the majority of the scholars for this ruse329, or they just didn’t think of an 
alternative weapon) or spear, the ruse was great. About this ruse, Hammond 
suggests that the drill that the Macedonian large army executed with the phalanx 
having a front of 100 men and depth of 120 men, if we can assume 12.000 
Phalangites,330 was feasible only on a broad land of flat ground. The sole region close 
to the camp and the city was the flatland which was located amid Gorice, i.e. Pellion 
and Mt. Veljak and to the south-west of that line. So, when Alexander directed the 
phalanx forward and then to the left, it appeared that he was threatening the 
Illyrians in Pellion and its area; when he directed it forward and then to the right, he 
appeared to threaten the enemy on the hillsides of the Mt Veljak, which were closest 
to the execution of the drill by Macedonians, i.e. the first hills.331 
 Hammond notes that Arrian described two separate actions of the infantry. The 
first was the wedge formation of the left phalanx, which had as result the retreat of 
the enemy from the first hills i.e. the Mt. Veljack on to a higher ground of Mt. 
Vipiakut. Τhe phalanx then obeyed at the second command which was the shouting 
and clash of weapons, which created terror to the Taulantians, who ran back to 
Pellion. The enemy on the southern side had no name, in contrast to the rivals on 
the northern side that were called Ταυλάντιοι (1.6.4.). The original source possibly 
named the missing enemy and Arrian pretermitted it. We can assume that the 
Dardanians were the missing rival.332 
  So, the Taulantians were on the northern hills and the Dardanians (except from 
those inside Pellion) were on the southern hills. When Alexander finished with the 
threat at Mt. Veljak of the Dardanians, the Taulantians descended from the northern 
hills (including the slopes of Gorice) and attacked or were ready to attack the rear of 
Alexander’s troops. However, that moment the phalanx turned and the war-cry with 
the clash of arms, a terrifying noise that arose from thousands men at the same time 
was enough to force the Taulantians to flight.333 As Green refers“ this sudden, 
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shattering explosion of sound, especially after the dead stillness which had preceded 
it, completely unnerved Glaucias tribesmen, who fled back in wild confusion from the 
foothills to the safety of their fortress.”334 And as Fuller states “An unexpected and 
tremendous shout can at times be as effective as a volley of musketry, as happened 
at the storming of the Alamo during the Texan Rising of 1836”.335 So, with these 
rapid steps forward, the main rival fled from the first hills because of the perfect act 
of the drill and of the sound of the appalling war cry.336 
  Then Alexander saw that a significant hill, from where his army would pass, was 
occupied by some Taulantians. Immediately, he ordered τοῖς σωματοφύλαξι καὶ τοῖς 
ἀμφ᾽ αὑτὸν ἑταίροις, (1.6.5) to take their shields on horseback and attack on the hill.  
The command was that if the enemy didn’t retreat, half of them were to fight on 
foot in combination with the cavalry. The attack of these selected troops made the 
enemies take flight again and to run to the mountains on either side.337The aim of 
Alexander was the Kalaja e Shpelles, it looms over the entrance of the Gryke e Ujkut 
and on the hill beside which his passage is located. Of course, his troops achieved 
their mission and the Taulantians retreated again, some to Mt. Trajan and others to 
Mt Shpile, (ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα τῶν ὀρῶν).  These are the mountains that border the Gryke 
e Ujkut. All that occurred while the phalanx was following with rapidity.338 This group 
of close companions was Alexander’s staff, his personal team that were comprised of 
high-ranking officers. In the action against the Illyrians, we can calculate their 
number as 100 or so.339 
 This tactic provoked curiosity for English, due to the utilization of the 
companions, where half of them fought as foot soldiers. English assumes that 
Alexander chose to attack the enemy without hindrance. The cavalry would strike 
the opponent faster in contrast with the infantry units. English concludes that 
Alexander wanted to remove the rivals from this pass before the Macedonian 
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infantry reached it. So, for this reason he used the cavalry in this unique way, with 
the goal of destroying the threat immediately.340 
 When Alexander occupied the hill with his hetairoi, he sent the Agrianians and 
the archers who were 2.000 men, to connect with the companions, while he ordered 
the Hypaspists to cross the river and the Macedonians (i.e. the phalanx.)  to follow 
them. There he gave the smart commands that when his troops were to cross the 
river, they would extend to the left, so that the phalanx might appear solid the 
moment they had crossed. Alexander from the occupied hill observed the 
movements of the Illyrians, who when they saw the Macedonians crossing the river, 
they rushed down from the mountains with the goal of attacking the Macedonian 
soldiers and Alexander, who were the last remaining troops, i.e. the rear guard that 
didn’t crossed the river.341 
 During this phase we can see that Alexander strengthened his bodyguards and 
the companions with the archers and Agrianians, while he occupied the Kalaja e 
Shpelles with his troops. The remaining of the army could advance with safety to the 
river, where the Hypaspists and the phalanx crossed the river and moved left onto 
the flat ground amid the entrance of the Gryke e Ujkut and Kalaja e Ventrokut. With 
that action, they maintained the close formation and confronted the enemy, who 
was on the slopes of Mt. Shpile and Kalaja e Ventrokut, while the force of Alexander 
was the rear-protector, who hadn’t crossed the river, the Illyrians descended from 
their hills, (Mt Trajan and Tren) and attacked them.342 
Here Arrian presents how Alexander again reacted immediately: 
Ὁ δὲ πελαζόντων ἤδη αὐτὸς ἐκθεῖ σῦν τοῖς ἀμφ᾽ αὑτόν, καὶ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὡς 
διὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιοῦσα, ἐπηλάλαξεν: οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι πάντων ἐπὶ σφᾶς 
ἐλαυνόντων ἐγκλίναντες ἔφευγον: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπῆγεν Ἀλέξανδρος τούς 
τε Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας δρόμῳ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμόν. Καὶ πρῶτος μὲν 
αὐτὸς φθάσας διαβαίνει τοῖς τελευταίοις δὲ ὡς εἶδεν ἐπικειμένους τοὺς 
πολεμίους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ τὰς μηχανὰς ἐξακοντίζειν ὡς 
πορρωτάτω ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐκέλευσεν ὅσα ἀπὸ μηχανῶν βέλη ἐξακοντίζεται, 
καὶ τοὺς τοξότας δὲ ἐκ μέσου τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐκτοξεύειν, ἐπεσβάντας καὶ 
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τούτους. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸν Γλαυκίαν εἴσω βέλους παρελθεῖν οὐκ 
ἐτόλμων, οἱ Μακεδόνες δὲ ἐν τούτῳ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπέρασαν τὸν ποταμόν, 
ὥστε οὐδεὶς ἀπέθανεν ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει αὐτῶν.343 
  
 The main jeopardy was from the attackers of the Mt. Trajan and Mt. Tren who 
came down from the slopes. Despite this, they still had to cross a trough before they 
attacked in the Kalaja e Shpelles. Alexander suddenly attacked them when they were 
close enough i.e. in this trough. We can assume that he used his elite forces again in 
the identical way as previously intended, namely half on foot and half on horses 
while the last part of the phalanx that crossed the river yelled the war-cry giving the 
impression that it would came back to attack. Here Hammond stipulates that the 
Hypaspists and the rest of the phalanx confronted the enemy at Mt. Shpile and 
Kalaja e Ventrotuk. Alexander took his archers and Agrianians across the river, while 
the elite of companions and the bodyguards remained with the aim of retreating 
without being overwhelmed.  Alexander prepared the firing, the archers entered the 
river and shot over the Kalaja e Shpelles, while the catapults on the river shore shot 
too. 344 
 Alexander’s catapults were established along the far shore of the river to provide 
cover during the retreat. This artillery was with the siege train that was obviously on 
its way to Pellion, but had not arrived when Alexander was sieging the city. Here 
English refers in contrast to Ashley and Green that the catapults threw arrows, 
(Ashley and Green suggest that the catapults threw stones) which were not really 
effective as anti-personnel weapons, nevertheless they were responsible for the 
creation of fear in the enemies, as we see according to the movements of the 
Illyrians, who didn’t venture to came close to the fire range of these weapons.345 The 
catapult was a new weapon and maybe the residents of the Balkans had never seen 
a weapon like this. This is an indication which justified the fear that a weapon like 
this can create in the rivals.346 The heavy missile fire of archers in combination with 
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the fire of the catapults repelled the Illyrians and resulted in a completely safe 
retreat.347 
 Sarantis emphasizes that this retreat maneuver, could only be achieved by the 
Macedonians. Alexander executed a magnificent retreat maneuver while crossing a 
river, for the first time in universal history and in his life. This maneuver in the 
military art was named « Retreating maneuver in front of the enemy». In front of an 
enemy who lurks and waits for a mistake or an omission during the retreat with the 
aim of benefitting from this and crashing the retreating troops.348 
 This brilliant deliberate retreat was a great maneuver of such a procedure that 
Alexander’s first failure to conquer the city balanced with his success of not losing a 
man, which was the result of the great leadership of Alexander, the strict discipline 
of the army and the tactical originality. This was the second time in antiquity where 
the artillery supported a field operation the first was the defeat of Philip by 
Onomarchus of Phocis as I mentioned above.349 
  The Taulantians under Glaukias who were located on the northern side, i.e. on 
Kalaja e Ventrokut and Mt Shpile, did not dare to come closer and to charge the 
phalanx. Alexander had achieved his goal, he occupied the entrance into the Gryke e 
Ujkut on its northern broader side and he could retreat his troops safely into the 
basin of Lake Ventrok. The most significant point was that the Illyrians could not 
follow him, since the Macedonian infantry could resist and hold the narrow passage 
and the companions could watch the flatland of the Prespa basin.350 
 Sarantis refers that Alexander in his whole life as general-king had never used so 
many maneuvers as here in the events at the battle of Pellion,351 while Fox adds that 
in no place was the phalanx more skilled than in the Illyrian expedition of 335 BC 
against Cleitus and Glaukias.352 Gabriel claims that nowhere was the Macedonian 
phalanx more flexible and maneuverable than the events of the Balkan campaign of 
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Alexander and he referred to the events of Pellion.353 Green states that if it was 
Alexander’s mistake of letting himself be trapped by the rivals , the stratagem that 
he followed, saved his troops, and adds that” Must stand as one of the most 
eccentrically brilliant stratagems in the whole history of warfare”. 354 While Dogde 
says about this maneuver “Never was so curious, so magnificent a ruse employed in 
war before; never since”.355 
 The choice of Alexander to pass his army through the wolf pass i.e. the Gryke e 
Ujkut in Albanian language, seems too reckless for an army of 25.000 men,356 if the 
rivals knew the plans of Alexander. However, the enemy knew nothing and the fraud 
of Alexander was his best weapon at this phase. No one could guess how Alexander 
would act at that formation of his troops.357 Moreover, we must not fοrget a fact 
which Arrian omits to refer. The transfer of the baggage-train was abandoned in the 
Macedonian camp. It was not present during the drills and the maneuvers of the 
Macedonian phalanx. If the Macedonian army carried the supplies with them, the 
enemy would have realized Alexander’s plan. Furthermore, the supplies weren’t at 
the crossing of the river either. All the rapidity of the maneuvers and the changes of 
front by the troops of Alexander would not be feasible if a baggage train related to 
the phalanx.358 On the other hand, the catapults and their projectiles were the 
military supplies that refer by Arrian, and it was possible that they transferred 
alongside or in the phalanx.  In conclusion, Alexander had no objective to retreat to 
Lyncus, but to defeat his enemies. This action is reminiscent of the famous words of 
the young king at Gaugamela: “Defeated we no longer have the need of baggage 
animals, victorious we shall have both ours and of the enemy’s”359(Polyan. IV.3.6, 
Plut. Alex. 32.3-4, Curt.4.15.7). 
 After his successive withdrawal, Alexander was informed that the rival forces 
were badly positioned in their base without the appropriate protective measures, i.e. 
no garrisons, palisade and ditch, and their line unduly elongated. They foolishly 
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believed that Alexander had retreated because he was panicked and the Illyrians 
became careless, and let their guard down. Alexander was prepared to punish them 
and to give them a lesson. After three days, at night, he crossed the river unnoticed, 
with his Hypaspists, Agrianians and the battalions of Perdiccas and Coenus while the 
rest of the army had the command to follow. When Alexander judged that he had 
the appropriate time to strike, without waiting for the army to concentrate, he gave 
his command to Agrianians and archers to attack. Their onslaught was unexpected 
and they struck the enemy line at one end, where their own onslaught in deep 
formation at its strongest was likely to strike the weakest point of the enemy. Many 
were killed in their beds, and many were killed immediately. Furthermore, many 
were captured as hostages and many were caught during their flight and many were 
killed during the retreat. Alexander’s cavalry pursued the troops of Glaukias until the 
mountains of Taulantians and some of them were saved without their weapons. 
Cleitus sought refuge into the Pellion and then he set fire to the city and fled to 
Glaukias and his Taulantians.360 
 The battalions of Perdiccas and Coenus were recruited from Upper Macedonia.361 
Coenus was the son of Polemocrates and his battalion first appeared in this event at 
Pellion. He may have had the generalship already from the late years of Philip’s 
reign. Perdiccas was the son of Orontes, a member of royal hypaspists at the time of 
the assassination of Philip October 336. In the events of Pellion, Perdiccas 
commanded the taxis of Orestians and Lyncestians.362 
 We must mention that Arrian doesn’t refer exactly what occurred. By that I 
mean, did the forces that were in Pellion, come out of the city? From the source, we 
can understand that there were no more troops inside the town and that they were 
all unprotected in the countryside because of their illusion of a fake victory. 
Alexander predicted that the barbarians would believe that he left from the 
battlefield. So, he retreated for some miles and offered three days to the Illyrians, 
with the goal of retrieving their confidence. Soon he had been proven justly by the 
good news, that the Illyrians had no protection. The overconfidence and the lack of 
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discipline of the foe proved to be the best allies of Alexander.363 From this bloodshed 
event, we realize that the Taulantians and the Dardanians had remained in their 
initial location i.e. near the Pellion in contrast with Alexander, who had retreated to 
some distance. We have reached this conclusion since the enemy thought that 
Alexander had withdrawn his army in panic and because of the information 
Alexander had on the position of his rivals. The abandonment of his supplies at the 
initial Macedonian camp and the pause of every hostility for three days, was the 
perfect trick to convince the Illyrians that Alexander had gone.364 
 So here, Hammond suggests that Alexander had retreated into the northern part 
of the Ventrok basin, while the Illyrians wrongly thought that he was on the way 
somewhere towards Upper Macedonia.365 However, Alexander’s plan was not over, 
he came back in the night concealed by darkness. His forces used the broader side of 
the Gryke e Ujkut and crossed the river from the right shore to the left shore. So, 
Alexander’s onslaught was on the eastern end of the rival line which was in the 
flatland south and west of the Gryke e Ujkut. The Taulantians and the Dardanians 
had encamped the night in the battle order which they kept during the day. That 
means that the Taulantians were on the left and the Dardanians on the right facing 
the Gryke e Ujkut.366 Alexander attacked immediately with Agrianians and archers 
without waiting for the rest of the army, if he had waited he would have lost his 
advantage of a surprise attack and the onslaught wouldn’t be so powerful.367 
Alexander got in through the end of the Dardanian line and turned right to roll up 
the line with the result of driving Cleitus into the Pellion.368 
 The Taulantians abandoned the battlefield and Alexander’s pursuit occurred 
through the flatlands of Poloske and through the flatlands of Korçë and presumably 
as far as Elbasan.369 The pursuit of the cavalry which lasted for some days over a 
large distance of 95 kilometers, secured the total victory of Alexander and harks back 
                                                          
363Green 2013, 134. 
364Hammond 1974,85,87. 
365Hammond 1974,85. 
366Hammond 1974,85-86. 
367English 2009,33. 
368Hammond 1974,85-86. 
369Hammond 1974,86. 
71 
 
to the decisive victory and pursuit of Philip in 358 BC.370 One of the major abilities of 
the cavalry was to destroy the army of enemy via a terrific pursuit. These pursuits 
which were unknown to the south Hellenes, were maybe a creation of Philip in his 
Balkan wars. Here at the pursuit of the Illyrians by Alexander, the major aim was to 
conquer the cavalrymen, because they were the elite in the kingdoms of Dardania 
and Taulantia. As Philip desired to subjugate the Illyrian kings by his exerting his 
personal effort, thus Alexander acted in the same way here in Illyria and later to 
Asia.371 
 Upon his return, Alexander had gained every supply that he had left in the camp 
and he had captured great booty. He might have actualized a siege to Pellion, but 
the terrible news from Thebes reached him, declaring the unrest of the Thebans. 
Alexander marched at speed while Cleitus burnt Pellion and rejoined with Glaukias in 
the region of Tirana.372 Alexander couldn’t complete the campaign because of the 
unrest in Thebes and the general turmoil in south Hellas. Time was limited and he 
couldn’t force the Illyrians kings to enter a formal allegiance. However, the Illyrians 
lost completely and there was no hope for new wars.373 Glaukias surrendered, and in 
this way he retained his throne, while Cleitus later made peace with Alexander, 
albeit we know nothing about it.374 (Image 9) 
  As Bosworth correctly refers, it was the Illyrians who were unconcerned about 
the defensive measures which urged Alexander to his surprise night charge and to 
destroy the Illyrian soldiery. The Illyrians with their apathy, permitted Alexander to 
be victorious and to avoid the initial advantage that the Illyrians had i.e. their 
position. Bosworth continues, if the Illyrians stayed under arms in caution until the 
news of Thebes arrived, they would had put Alexander in a very difficult position and 
would have created an extremely difficult dilemma. If he had abandoned the case in 
Thebes, he would probably have had a vast war in southern Hellas. On the other 
hand, if he had retreated to deal with Thebes, the Illyrians would have stayed 
aggressive and active in their position, keen to threaten his kingdom. All in all, he 
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was saved by an affair of a few days. The Illyrians were defeated because of their 
negligence, while a little more effort towards a defensive organization would have 
written the story of Alexander in other way.375 
  English interprets the campaign of Pellion as being a great example for analyzing 
the abilities of Alexander in the procedure of siege craft. In this case, we can see 
many mistakes according to his thinking. To begin with, English supports that 
Alexander’s error was that he did not have enough supplies which could help him to 
actualize a strong siege. Of course, the situation got harder when he ended up being 
surrounded by Dardanians and Taulantians, something that was also characterized 
by Ashley as a mistake.376 An interesting point is that Alexander learned from his 
mistakes, we see later in Hydaspes, where he was aware of the advancing 
reinforcements and forces a battle before they arrive, in contrast with Pellion where 
he didn’t seem to have such cognizance. This was a result of a significant lack of 
scouts, but it can be a declaration that the wooded and mountainous land was too 
difficult a terrain, and had as a result that the coming powers weren’t perceived by 
the scouts. Maybe the two hypotheses are responsible for this situation.377 English 
continues, that the expedition of Philotas who was responsible for obtaining food 
was too hazard and risky. If it was Alexander’s plan to retreat, then he could act 
without waiting by the ruse that he chose and foraging was not necessary. This 
movement declares that Alexander had as his goal to continue the siege towards the 
city although he was surrounded. However, except for these mistakes, English 
admits the brilliance of the maneuvers and of the retreat of some days from the 
region by Alexander, which offered him the victory.378  
 After Alexander’s successful campaign, he received Illyrian mercenaries to Asia 
although these may have been dispatched later. These troops reinforced Alexander’s 
soldiery but also acted as hostages for the good attitude of their people. Moreover, 
Alexander gathered around him Illyrian forces through that action that in any other 
case would not be so quiet, while Alexander was in the East. From Curtius, we are 
informed that Alexander received reinforcements from Antipater which were Illyrian 
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troops. Antipater as regent was responsible for safeguarding the interests of the king 
at the Illyria border, as long as Alexander would be in Asia379. This period was 
spectacularly peaceful for Illyria and Epirus, even though during the first half of the 
320s, Hellas and its neighbors suffered from a famine.  Diodorus informs us about 
some ambassadors who came to Alexander and congratulated him for his 
achievements, just before his end. Maybe this was a sign of their conformity.380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
379 Greenwalt 2010, 295 ;Diod 17.17.4 , Curt. 4.13.31 , Curtius 6.6.35   also see : Sarantis 1977,260. 
380Greenwalt 2010, 295 ,  Diod.17.113.2. 
74 
 
 
b. Formidable Illyrians? 
The events of Pellion from another facet. 
 
 
 So, why did the Dardanians and Taulantians fail? Or even better; why did 
Alexander succeed? If we take a closer glance to Arrian, we can shed light in this 
case. In contrast, to many scholars, I would not justify the defeat of Illyrians because 
of the greatness of Alexander. Instead, I strongly believe that Alexander succeeded in 
this lunatic mission because of the incapability of Illyrians to face a professional 
army, which formed in array for battle. Sarantis correctly argues that the Illyrians in 
the events of Pellion, more specifically during the first battle, when they sacrificed 
the youths and animals, i.e. the Dardanians, were not well equipped with defensive 
armor and were incapable of fighting a battle in array. This was the reason why they 
retreated to town.381 
  If we want to find some authoritative conclusions we must go deeper into the 
war history of Illyrians and Macedonians. The first contacts of these two people 
came from the passage of Polyaenus, who inform us that the Macedonians at the 
time that Argaeus was the king, with a ruse, they used the women to appear as army 
and forced Taulantians to flight from the battlefield. The Macedonians gained victory 
without giving a fight.382 The next hostile incident occurred, during the kingship of an 
infant, Aeropus. The Macedonians had been used to the hostilities with Thracians 
and Illyrians and they had achieved a reputation for their military action. However, 
the son of Philip I, Aeropus, was still a baby and this situation led the Illyrians to 
attack the Macedonian realm. The Macedonians brought the infant in the front lines 
during the battle and they managed to defeat the rivals. The presence of the young 
king offered confidence in Macedonian troops, who believed that the fortune 
supported them.383 
 Although Justin states that the Macedonians had gained a reputation for war 
against these tribes, the next incident indicates that the troops of Perdiccas II were 
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not the most capable forces. However, according to the passages of Polyaenus and 
Justin, we keep a reservation due to the fact that these two passages are doubtful as 
to their historicity, albeit they are great paradigms for the rival relationship between 
these two people, while there is no reason to doubt that they express a truth that, 
from the early times Macedonia was threatened by Illyrian raids.384 
 In 424 BC during the Peloponnesian war, Brasidas oversaw an expedition to the 
north. Meanwhile, Perdiccas II ensured a portion of the costs that was related to 
Brasida’s campaign to confirm him as an ally in the war against Arrhabaeus of 
Lyncus, whom Perdiccas at the time desired to subject him under his sway.  Although 
he had his first failures, in the end Perdiccas succeeds in gaining Brasidas’ help in the 
war against Arrhabaeus because Brasidas too, needed Perdiccas as an ally in these 
regions, as enemy of the Athenians. This campaign was successful in the beginning, 
as the armies of Perdiccas and Brasidas defeated the forces of Arrhabaeus, but their 
luck changed when the Illyrians mercenaries that had been employed by Perdiccas, 
betrayed him and supported the Lyncestian forces. In front of the danger of the 
Illyrian threat, the troops of Perdiccas abandoned the mission and retreated, leaving 
the south Hellenes alone against the combined forces of Arrhabaeus and of 
Illyrians.385 
 In fact, the speech of Brasidas, offers some light to us in the case of the Illyrian 
military ability. The Spartan general pointed out that the Illyrians had large forces, 
their battle cry were intolerable and the idle brandishing of their weapon had a 
similar terror effect. But in fact, these men in close combat were not the threat that 
they seem to be. Because if their rivals, remained in their positions, the Illyrians who 
don’t have a regular order, would not hesitate to retreat, as in their customs, the 
retreat had the same honor as staying in the battlefield. So, their courage is not 
always a credible fact. However, we must not forget that, until the bad news arrived 
which related to the betrayal of the Illyrians, Brasidas was prepared to fight with 
these men at his side, which later in his speech he accused.386 
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  In the end, the Spartan battalion achieved to withdraw with safety and to move 
away from the Illyrian threat because of their superior organization, training and 
strict docility. Thucydides here presented that the Illyrians can shock their rivals but 
in fact he demoted their value against a professional and capable opponent as the 
troops of Brasidas, in contrast with the troops of Perdiccas who panicked and ran. 
Nonetheless, we must not forget that the presence of the Illyrians in this mission was 
not a cause for conquest or of loyalty, but a goal for profit.387 
  In the subsequent years, Archelaus tried to create a stronger Macedonia but his 
death provoked chaos in the kingdom and four rulers rose and fell in seven years 
(399-393). Amyntas III who succeeded of dying from naturals causes, abandoned his 
kingdom twice because of two Illyrians invasions.388 Of course, with so turmoil in 
Macedonia, after the evanescent kings, it was logical that the Illyrians would 
dominate in the war, if we judge from the paradigm of Aeropus on how significant 
the king was for the Macedonian people. 
 In the short reign of Alexander ΙΙ, we know that he offered a sum of money and 
his brother Philip II as hostage to the Illyrians for gaining the peace.389 Afterwards, 
we have the death of Perdiccas III at 359 BC, where 4.000 Macedonians with their 
king died on the battlefield against Bardylis an Illyrian chieftain of Dardanians.390 As 
we know for Philip II, he created an army, trained his troops and prepared them for 
fighting.391 Gabriel aptly refers that in contrast with the southern Hellenes, who had 
established a capable hoplite infantry, the Macedonians had never created infantry 
units in the same model for infantry battle. In fact, the infantry Macedonians units 
were close to untrained peasants, who were hastily gathered for the occasion, with 
poor armor that was suitable for agriculture work. The significant military unit of the 
Macedonians constituted the horsemen who belonged to the elite class, they had 
theirs horses and their own equipment and fought as individuals. Alexander II may 
have made an effort of creating a hoplite army that would be composed of hundred 
troops, but they would probably perish in the catastrophe of 359 B.C., while 
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Macedonia remained with its inefficient peasant infantry unit.392 Moreover, as 
Greenwalt states, Illyrians raid Macedonia, since Macedonia was weaker than most 
poleis and because it was closer to the Illyrian terrain in contrast to most poleis 
(apart from cities such as Epidamnus and Apollonia). These may be the reasons and 
not due to any special enmity.393 These data indicate that the Macedonians were not 
capable troops, due to the fact that may had experience, and the memory of fear for 
the Illyrians, albeit they did not have some serious training program which would 
develop their fighting skills. Diodorus informs us that the first victims of the brand 
new Macedonian army were the Paeonians, who Philip defeated and made them 
subjects to Macedonian authority. Then, he attacked the Illyrians and defeated 
Bardylis in a great battle.394 
 An interesting passage that will enlighten us about this though is from the speech 
of Alexander the Great at Opis (324). 
Καὶ πρῶτά γε ἀπὸ Φιλίππου τοῦ πατρός, ᾗπερ καὶ εἰκός, τοῦ λόγου ἄρξομαι. 
Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς 
νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα ὀλίγα καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς 
καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θρᾳξίν, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν 
φορεῖν ἔδωκεν, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας τοῖς 
προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι πιστεύοντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ 
οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι, πόλεών τε οἰκήτορας ἀπέφηνε καὶ νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρηστοῖς 
ἐκόσμησεν.395 
 
 This passage is the ultimate evidence that shows us that the Macedonians did not 
have great abilities in fighting such as their rivals i.e. Illyrians, who were used to 
tribal wars. Alexander supports that Philip made the Macedonians capable of 
fighting. (ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας) 
 Greenwalt points out that Philip, after about 18 months of plotting, training and 
achieving his aims, he directed his army against Bardylis.396 Being a martial artist for 
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several years, I know that it is truly difficult to learn to defend yourself, let alone to 
learn to act and fight in a formation as the phalanx where you have to operate and 
fight as a group , as one unit.  The action of fighting demands time, intensive 
practice, patience and perseverance. There is no short path and these characteristics 
remain the same no matter how many years pass. Polyaenus informs us that Philip 
accustomed the Macedonians to constant exercise before they went to war.397 Here 
we see that Philip very soon, put his army out to the field by defeating Paeonians 
and then the Illyrians. This is a strong indication that the Macedonians and the other 
tribes were used to tribal wars and not in professional conflicts where hoplites 
phalanx attended (e.g. battle of Chaeronea 338 BC). By that I mean, that when the 
Macedonians received special training in war, immediately they surpassed their 
enemies i.e. the Thracians, Paeonians and Illyrians. The Macedonian soldiery was 
created during the years of the crisis and Philip II fabricated its structure, arms and 
tactics for dealing with the crisis.398 
 Moreover, the fact that in only 18 months Philip managed to dominate the 
Paeonians and Illyrians, reinforces the view that the Illyrians and Paeonians were not 
so formidable enemies. In a short period of several months, no army can be 
transformed into a great force like this. Unless the enemy is not so great. Although 
we have the testimony of Strabo who supports that, from the Illyrians the strongest 
was the Autariate, Ardiaei and Dardanians. Nevertheless, we must not infer that 
these forces were so effective in battle against every opponent. We must have in our 
mind that they were the strongest among the Illyrians.399 
 About the passage of Diodorus 16.3 which informs us about the creation of the 
new Macedonian phalanx, many scholars agree that Diodorus here had compressed 
an action which lasted for years.400 Hammond refers that the new formation needed 
constant practice for training the new weapon and the new order. He supports that 
the troops that Philip had received from his brother Perdiccas, were trained in these 
new military formations since 364 BC.  These troops were not in the catastrophe of 
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359 BC.401 I believe that Hammond is correct, but my doubt is about the other army 
that needed to learn how to fight in the new phalanx of Philip. For the sake of 
convenience, we can assume that from that period i.e. 359 the Macedonians were 
trained in sarissa, although it is known that many scholars don’t accept this 
argument. 
 It is known that when Philip attained the leadership of Macedonia, the state was 
in vast danger on each side from external threats, so there was the necessity for an 
army that could immediately resist. In this way, Philip created the Macedonian 
phalanx. Gabriel believes that the Macedonian phalanx was a military instrument 
that was created in a short period with the aim to cover the pressing necessities of 
the kingdom.402 Fox believes, that Philip could have made the new phalanx capable 
within months. He supports this, because in 2003 he watched the training of a large 
infantry-army in the use of sarissa, without these men having any experience. They 
practiced in the Moroccan desert and for this they employed Moroccan army-
members and other recruits. Fox said that: “Within five weeks, units of 256 warriors 
each had blended into a workable sarissa-army, if only for (complex) film-maneuvers 
and lifelike combat.” He concludes that, Philip’s training was much more demanding, 
harder and constant than Oliver Stone’ sex-marine commanders. Thus, Philip could 
have created a capable phalanx within months.403 If this is true, then we can add 
with reasonable safety that the Illyrians were defeated by an army that was created 
in a few months, when this new army clashed with Illyrians had the experience of 
one year and few months. 
 Of course, the Illyrians were a formidable enemy, but they were more specialized 
in pillaging and their invasions were not the result of some notorious enmity against 
the Macedonians but they had the main objective of making a profit. So, they were 
not forces who made a conquest, but they attacked for spoils.404 As Curtius refers, 
the Illyrians and Thracians were people accustomed to living by rapine.405 Only 
Bardylis was a great paradigm of the Illyrian military action, with Bardylis, we saw a 
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series of calamities in Macedonia and Epirus. As Hammond refers this man was the 
precursor of Philip II in the establishment of a strong monarchy.406 
 Diodorus informs us, that Dionysius the tyrant of the Syracusans allied with 
Illyrians and planned to put Alcetas who was in exile on the Epirote throne. He sent 
two thousand troops to reinforce the Illyrians and 500 Hellenic type panoplies which 
the Illyrians offered to their stronger troops. In the battle that followed, 15.000 
Mollosians perished. The total disaster was curbed by the Spartans who sent aid to 
the hapless Epirotes. This massacre occurred in 385/4.407 This occasion and the 
incident of Perdiccas’ death with 4.000 Macedonians, illustrates that the Illyrians 
were a formidable foe to people with no special war training. However, when the 
opponent of the Illyrians was capable and worthy, they had no advantage in fighting, 
as we see from Philip’s and Alexander’s military actions and the minimal contacts of 
the Spartans and Illyrians. As Hammond states, in comparison with Alexander’s 
forces, the Dardanians and Taulantians were amateur, although the Dardanians had 
killed 4000 Macedonians in 359 BC.408 What was the difference? The Macedonians of 
Perdiccas III were not the same Macedonians of Philip II and his son Alexander. 
Moreover, as Dogde, Sarantis and Droysen attested to the war at Pellion, these 
movements of Alexander’s troops could only be executed by the Macedonians,409 i.e. 
the well-trained army. 
 Hammond points out that the infantry of the Macedonians was superior from the 
infantry forces of Cleitus and Glaukias but only in the plain, and he adds that the 
forces of Illyrians were larger and were first-class troops.410 Sarantis refers that the 
troops of Cleitus, although they had not had the coordinate formation of the 
Macedonian army, they were rough warriors with great endurance, while they were 
specialists in irregular mountainous war. He concludes that the war history of the 
Macedonians with Illyrians proved the Illyrians as a being a hard enemy.411 The 
archetypal Illyrian combatant was undisciplined and light armed while fought as an 
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individual, with the aim of displaying military bravery.412 Ashley, refers that the 
Illyrian infantry preferred to occupy an impressive wooded hill that offered to them 
some advantages against a variety of troops.413 Albeit here we saw that the Illyrians 
didn’t manage to confront Alexander on the hills, when Alexander tried to secure his 
foraging mission. In fact, for me the inability of Illyrians to follow a tactic or a well-
organized strategy is an indication of their low military level. They were capable in 
mountainous war, but they achieved nothing with the occupation of hills to Pellion. 
The greatest evidence is that they could easily run for their lives, since it was not a 
shame.414 Moreover, we have to mention that, the Illyrian social life based on the 
social concept of a tribe, a triumphant tribe such as the Ardiaei reduced some of its 
neighbors to bondage. Other tribes were forced by the Ardiaei to pay tribute. 
Furthermore the Dardanians too, had large number of slaves who fought in the wars 
under the leadership of Dardanians.415 This indicate that a part of the large 
Dardanian army was composed by slaves, who of course were not equal to the 
professional Macedonian forces. 
 We can add with some safety, that the Illyrians were a hard rival for the 
Macedonians before Philip II, after the contribution of this great king to the military 
affairs, the Illyrians were not equals to the Macedonian army. Τhe Macedonian 
soldiery was superior in comparison to  every force in the central or eastern 
Mediterranean at that era. They had been trained under Philip II and the 
Macedonian armory, defensive and offensive was not equal to the light armed 
Balkan tribes. These tribes were swarm of warriors who fought as individuals, 
reminding one of the Homeric era. Because of their low discipline they had little 
staying forces, while at the first difficulty they retreated in disarray. After a defeat, it 
was almost impossible for them to concentrate again for further military action.416 
 In conclusion, the success of Alexander against the Illyrians was due to his 
brilliance, military commandership and of course, courage. He fought in the first 
lines and he was injured by a stone which was thrown to his head and he received a 
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blow in the neck by a club.417 However, the inability of the Dardanians and 
Taulantians to confront a highly trained army was the main reason for his 
accomplishment. Τhe Illyrians had trapped Alexander in a desperate position with no 
supplies, they had the advantage of the hills, the fortified city, and finally they had 
larger forces. Nevertheless, in every operation and battle they failed and retreated 
many times even without giving a single fight. As already mentioned above, 
Alexander had some serious problems as well and managed to escape because the 
Illyrians didn’t offer him a dignified battle as the Triballians had done. In fact, as 
Green states during these first campaigns of Alexander, as it proven the 
psychological exploitation of tribal contumacy was one of the strongest weapons of 
king.418 Something that worked against the Getae and, of course, the Illyrians. 
 The Thracians were inferior too, but the reason I’m focusing on the Illyrians is 
because they had the golden opportunity to offer a lethal strike to Alexander, in 
contrast with the other rivals in the Thraco-Illyrian campaign, and in a totally 
remarkable way, they failed. In fact, all this can be proven through the actions of 
Alexander in the campaign of 335 BC. Firstly , he called the Celts ἀλαζόνες  because 
they were not afraid of him , secondly the crossing of Danube with the aim to 
destroy the morale of the people of Peuce , thirdly the fact that he started a 
blockade of a town although Glaukias was on his way to Pellion , fourth the fact that 
English refer that at the first battle Cleitus retreated into the town immediately, an 
indication of his low confidence about his troops, and finally that when Alexander 
was  trapped , he kept his plan for victory instead of retreat , all these data indicate 
the risky and brave character of Alexander, but they also indicate that Alexander 
underestimated his opponent’s military value and knew very well the superiority of 
Macedonians. This knowledge, i.e. of the military superiority was a result, of his 
father’s expansions and from his own military experiences and of course because the 
Macedonian army had prevailed in Chaeronea, which was a professional hoplite 
clash, let alone here in conflicts with undisciplined tribes. 
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                              Chapter IV 
 
                          Logistics of the campaign. 
 
Φιλώταν δὲ ἀναλαβόντα τῶν ἱππέων ὅσους ἐς προφυλακὴν καὶ τὰ 
ὑποζύγια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐς ἐπισιτισμὸν ἔπεμπε. (Arr. An. 1.5.9) 
 
a. Macedonian Logistics vs Hellenic Logistics, Difference and Effectiveness. 
  
 The logistics of the Macedonian army is not part of the most common studies for 
Alexander, while little evidence can support the representation of this system. As far 
as the Balkan campaign of 335 B.C. is concerned, only a small passage with no 
significant details is offered by Arrian to us. So, here my task is to attempt to 
consider how Alexander would have acted in this field.  
  It is true that the base of strategy and tactics is the replenishment. It is obvious 
that without any broad supply system, Alexander would have failed to accomplish 
his lightning marches or to achieve to cross desert and hard terrains, something that 
was actualized in the later years in the East.419 It is unanimously accepted that 
Alexander was a great commander, and the traditional view indicates that one factor 
for successive leadership is an advanced intelligence and communication system.420 
However, there is little evidence about the communication system of Alexander. This 
occurred because of the minor interest421 the people showed who wrote for 
Alexander, or on the transportation of the historical knowledge a part of it, change 
or lost.422Αs we know Alexander was cognizant of the magnitude of military 
intelligence and the significance of having sufficient food for his troops.423 It is 
known how important the military intelligence was, especially for the logistics of the 
Macedonian army, due to the fact that intelligence was necessary for an efficient 
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logistic system as had been analyzed in the work of Engels ”Alexander’s intelligence 
system”.424 
 It was very crucial for every ancient commander to take care of the logistics. 
Some errors to the logistics calculation, would lead to a huge calamity that would 
provoke more casualties than the most frightening battle.425 Hence, it was 
important, either to establish magazines of provisions beforehand or to have a 
supporting fleet whether it could occur. Only a professional logistic system could 
support the insurance of provisions for the long marches. It was significant for the 
general to know the route perfectly so that the army would follow, and that was a 
result of the intelligence. To create magazines, advanced groups who must have 
secured some alliances or to arrange for the local populations to provide the army 
with efficient supplies. Furthermore, some protection system must have been 
responsible for the provisions until the main force arrived. Communications was a 
significant part of these situations since the army of Alexander was vast and it could 
survive only via professional logistical action, of which communications, local and 
long distance are an essential characteristic.426 
 Alexander from his early life, showed his interest for the interior affairs of Persia, 
when he asked and impressed the Persian envoys, who saw a young boy asking them 
about the roads and the military force of the Persian Empire.427 Although this 
incident is doubtful as to its historicity, we can support that this fact illustrates the 
types of questions that the Macedonian court would ask the Persian 
authorities.428Moreover, it can relate to logistics affairs. The roads, as it is logical 
have always been a part of logistic plans. 
  Moreover, Vitruvius presents us with an Alexander, who fully understands the 
difficulties of supplementation of cities (or armies which are moving cities) when 
they are far away from tillable land. As a general characteristic, according to Engels 
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we can add that the successfulness of Alexander’s campaign is a result of his 
fastidious concern about the provisioning of his troops.429 
  As expected, every chapter of Alexander’s military affair we research, we must 
first see Philip’s contribution to that field. The army that Philip left to his young son 
was an advanced and renewed soldiery. It was the most efficient force in Europe or 
Asia. The new heir of the throne, cared to maintain the veterans of his father, the 
obedient measures and the logistic system that was in use during the reign of 
Philip.430 Some authorities agree that Philip invented the first logistic system for the 
armies in Hellenic warfare, setting the standard for the future soldieries in the 
West.431 So, in the Balkan campaign as it is logical we see the logistic model of Philip 
II. 
 In order to gain a better understanding of the Macedonian logistic system that 
Philip established, we must compare it with the logistic system of the other Hellenes. 
Hellenic armies were used to march from their cities for short distances, they fought 
with the enemy and then they return to their cities, where the soldiers demobilized 
until the next emergency.432 In fact, Hellenic armies had limited logistic efficiency, 
while they couldn’t retain their armies in the field for a long time or to march for 
long routes.433 
 Why is that? The majority of Hellenic armies used a servant for each hoplite and 
the Spartans had even seven servants. Arms and panoply were carried by the 
servants or baggage animals and not by the warriors. In fact, the existence of a lot of 
followers, as slaves, women, sutlers and other hangers-on, had as a result that 
sometimes the number of followers with no fighting ability, were larger than the 
number of warriors. The usage of many attendants and valets would increase the 
amount of supplies and could not offer anything to the fighting capability of the 
army. This impractical policy had as a result that these armies couldn’t have a great 
range for their campaigns far away from the fatherland, because they would face 
logistic problems. The more provisions that were consumed, the shorter expedition 
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range of the soldiery. Moreover, the utilization of oxcarts and wagons rendered their 
armies slower.  Without a proper and well organized logistic system, the Hellenic 
armies were unable to support a field operation for long routes, which resulted in 
the army becoming inefficient in a strategic war.434 
 On the other hand, Philip saw the situation of logistics in a different way and for 
sure his brilliance is evident as very soon he realized the value of an efficient 
replenishment system. Philip created a logistic system that could reinforce the army 
for long distances over long periods.435 I would start with the evidence of the ancient 
sources and later I will proceed with their analysis. 
 Frontinus inform us, that Philip forbade anyone to use a cart and that only one 
servant was allowed per one horseman, while on the infantry he allowed for every 
ten men, only one servant who was ordered to carry the mills and ropes. When the 
army marched in the summer quarter, Philip commanded that each soldier must 
carry his flour for a month.436 Polyaenus refers, that Philip accustomed the 
Macedonians to continuing exercise before wars. The Macedonians often marched 
300 stadia with their arms, panoply, food and utensils.437 
 Firstly, why did Philip forbid carts? Philip’s early conflicts were fought in the 
Upper Macedonia, Illyria, Thrace and Paeonia. Αll these regions are mountainous 
enough with abrupt paths , expeditious streams and several places where his army 
could fall on a destructive ambuscade. So, carts wouldn’t be valuable in these 
lands.438A horse with a breast band is not useful for heavy cargos. However, a horse 
collar permits these animals to be utilized effectively as draft animals, a task that 
only oxen would do.439  The population of Macedonia was poor and scattered, it 
didn’t have the ability to afford a panoply along the Hellenic standards, let alone if 
the state had to recruit the few oxen of the poor Macedonia, few Macedonians 
owned oxen, horses or mules, and it wouldn’t be easy for the villagers to lose their 
animals for a military expedition, the result of which would be catastrophic for the 
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finance of the village farmers.440 We can generally add, that the Macedonians didn’t 
have the opportunity to dispose of a vast number of animals.441 
  Engels supports that Ox carts were never utilized by Alexander, because oxen can 
only attain a velocity of 2 mph and their hooves are not suitable for traveling many 
kilometers.  Oxen are very slow animals and are frequently incapable of traveling 
more than seven or eight miles per day before becoming exhausted. Their stamina is 
less than that of a horse or mule. They can work only for five hours in contrast with 
the mules or horses, which can work for eight hours per day. Therefore, the ox carts 
could not attain the demanding velocity, which would help them to conform to an 
army’s daily marches, some for fifteen miles per day. One more reason for the 
confined utilization of carts by Philip and his son was the ineffective throat and girth 
harness used for horses and mules at the ancient times. The throat harness was put 
over the animal’s windpipe, and the harder it tugged, the more it suffered from 
choking. The weight that could be pulled was so little that it can be compared to a 
current shoulder harness. Moreover, they could break down, and their velocity 
would be reduced in rough and hilly country because they would have to pull harder, 
and as a result would choke themselves. Even more they were slower as I mention 
and they frequently demanded special routes because these animals were not able 
to travel the same trail as the pack animals.442 
 So, according to this logic, the commanders in antiquity believed that the 
utilization of carts would reduce the velocity and the motility of the army and it 
would reinforce the occupation of overweight baggage by soldiers.443 A horse could 
easily transfer 200-250 pounds of load when it was equipped with panniers. An ox 
can transfer 1000 pounds of load a day, albeit five horses can transfer the same 
cargo for thirty-two miles a day at twice the velocity, with half of food.444 Hence, 
Philip replaced ox carts with horses and mules, which were used as pack animals.445 
As we mention, it has been supporting that Philip created an army with different 
logistic organization in contrast with contemporary Hellenes and Persians, who had a 
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large logistic tails to follow the fighting force, with a result to make these armies 
slower and more vulnerable.446 
  On the other hand, Ferril supports that in the field of logistics, a field that 
Hellenes didn’t develop, Philip followed the ancient near Eastern system and used it 
to his soldiery.447 The utilization of few animals and carts for the practical needs by 
the Macedonian army was a practice that Persians already used. Ferril observes an 
initiation of Philip and Alexander to the logistical system of Cyrus the younger. 448 It 
is true that the Persians first utilized the horse as a pack animal for the logistic 
column, however Philip was the first Western general, who realized the valuable of 
utilizing horses as pack animals.449 Concerning other animals, Engels refer that 
donkeys, oxen and ox carts were not used, in contrast with Karunanithy who states 
that donkeys and asses were also utilized depending on what was available. The later 
added the camel (332) and is out of my concern.450 
  Now let’s research the statement of Polyaenus and Frontinus about the soldiers 
and the attendants. In Philip’s and Alexander’s armies, the soldiers were responsible 
for carrying their arms, panoply, utensils, and some supplies while they marched, 
compared to the other Hellenic and Persian armies who used servants or carts to 
carry those objects. In addition, Philip relieved his logistics further by decreasing the 
number of attendants and by prohibiting wives, women and other civilian personnel 
to follow the soldiery, a custom that Alexander retained until the army turned inland 
away from the Mediterranean towards Mesopotamia.451 A large crowd of people 
with no fighting skills would be a disadvantage in the difficult terrains of the Balkans, 
i.e. Thrace, Paeonia, Illyria. It would slow the army and it would make it vulnerable 
when it crossed mountain paths.452 It is possible that Philip too knew the actions of 
Xenophon, if we judge from the crossing of Danube River where Alexander applied a 
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crossing river tactic of Xenophon. It is plausible that Philip, decreased the number of 
attendants and animals imitating Xenophon.453 
 Gabriel suggests that a Macedonian army of 10000 troops would have 1600 
attendants to carry food and equipment. These attendants could help to undertake 
many tasks as cutting roads, or to advance to forage missions when the transported 
food supply was exhausted. Finally, these followers guarded the camp and could 
participate in battles as light infantry. 454 
 Since many supplies were carried by the men and their few servants in the 
Macedonian army, we can easily realize that the baggage train would comprise of a 
confined number of pack animals and very few wagons.455 Hence, any other 
contemporary army would need much more pack animals in contrast with the 
Macedonians. Furthermore, the Macedonians had limited the problem of finding so 
many animals and of feeding the animal in this way. The limited utilization of carts 
would increase the velocity of army to rough terrains. Moreover, in that way the 
drivers and the necessary tools and wood for fixing the wagons, would be decreased 
as well.456 
  So, with these significant differences, we can add that a Hellenic hoplite army of 
20.000 men which was followed by a crowd of attendants, would need almost the 
same food supplies as a Macedonian army of 35.000 men, while the hoplite soldiery 
was much slower.457 Ferril convincingly  refers: “ Allowing ten miles a day for a 
hoplite army, in a thirty-day campaign a Macedonian army of 35.000 could strike at 
a target 400 miles away on the same amount of food that would take a hoplite army 
of 20,000 no more than 300 miles.”458 
 In conclusion, the brilliant logistic organization was first achieved during the 
Balkan campaigns of Philip, as already mentioned.459 He trained his troops to carry 
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their armory and their own supplies of food on the march as I mention, he 
prohibited the wagons and the women. A lot of equipment was carried by the 
servants and not by the pack animals or wagons. Philip developed this logistic system 
because it would be efficient for his expeditions in the mountainous terrains of 
Thrace, Paeonia and Illyria where the utility of wagons would be inefficient over the 
mountains trails, while a large crowd of valets would reduce the velocity of the army 
and would make it defenseless while crossing mountain passes, as I already 
postulated.460 Thus, the development of Philip had as an aim to create the most light 
and mobile force that had ever existed, which would be able to actualize rapid 
attacks against rivals, before they understood what happened.461 Philip’s alterations 
permitted his army to move faster and to march longer routes in a day, and remain 
in the field for weeks with its own provisions, something that none of the other 
Hellenic armies could achieve. Moreover, the strategic range of Philip’s army was 
greater than any other Hellenic force.462 
 In this phase we can note an alteration of a Roman general. Frontinus and 
Plutarch informed us about a similar policy by Caius Marius, who ordered his soldier 
to carry his own necessary objects and reduced the number of the animals. With 
that action the troops of Marius gained the name “Marian mules.”463 Perhaps when 
Marius actualized these alterations in 99 BC to his army, he was imitating Philip’s 
policies.464 However, the Roman armies during the Imperial Period had more pack 
animals in contrast with Macedonians of Philip and Alexander era.465According to 
this logic, although Ferril supported that Philip used the Persian logistic system, it is 
obvious that the Persian army had half of the velocity of the Macedonian soldiery 
due to the fact that it had a huge supply train, which the great king used in his 
army.466 
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b. Men and Animals in the Macedonian Logistic Machine. 
 
 
 Although in the previous subsection, we refer to the restricted use of animals in 
the Macedonian army, some pack and draught animals were albeit necessary for the 
practical necessities of transportation, i.e. to carry items that people couldn’t.467 
 In the Macedonian soldiery, wagons were utilized when there were roads. 
Contrariwise, the pack animals were utilized in terrains with no paths and were led 
by trained drivers, where most them were weaponless.468 Although we discuss the 
usefulness of a light logistic tail with few wagons and pack animals, some recruited 
pack animals would be necessary to transfer the army’s significant supplies such as 
tents, hammocks, medical provisions, the ambulance, the military machines, 
firewood, and loot. Packed animals were connected to Macedonian infantry at dekas 
or team; the horses, mules and donkeys were able of pulling a 60-100 kg. cargo. By 
using packsaddle or twin panniers, the animals transported water containers. Other 
objects were mills, straps, provender, and maybe some palisade stakes for the 
building of a camp in a campaign when the area had ellipses of trees. Also, all the 
equipment of a group for constructions, such as axes or adzes, saws or sickles, 
mattocks, picks and shovels. In fact, the pack animals could carry the cumbersome 
items at a ratio of one animal to fifty individuals.469 So here, Gabriel offers us a 
paradigm by supporting that Philip’s soldiery in the Illyria campaign required only 
200 pack animals for a fighting force of 10000 combatants.470 
 As we see, Philip’s army could cross 15 miles in a day and it could cross 20 miles 
on a forced march. Gabriel points out that these distances could have been traveled, 
although Philip had to stop every hour and rest the pack animals and horses for ten 
minutes. Afterwards, there was a cessation every three hour and to take off the 
animal’s burden and relax them for thirty minutes.471 However, these animals 
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needed food for the continuation of their contribution to the Macedonian army. The 
horses and the mules would require a ration of 10 lb. forage i.e. straw or chaff, and 
10 lb. of grain per day. Each animal that was used, would need 8 gal. of water per 
day. If the animal hasn’t eaten for few days as it is logical, the requirements would 
increase, and it might require 20 gal at one time. The rations for humans and animals 
could be decreased for small periods, and it’s always depending on the terrain and 
climate, but if the army and the animals remained without food for several days, the 
army would paralyze in starvation and it would lose its ability to go to war.472 
 Αs for people , the humans were as useful as the horses in antiquity. This was a 
result of the ineffective throat and girth harness. If we compare human and animal, 
we can see that the man can carry one third the burden of the latter i.e. about 80 lb. 
for long distances. Although, the man needed only one of third the amount of grain 
supplies of a horse. However, we mentioned that the practical tools were carried by 
animals.473 Engels suggests that the minimal ration for each man on a campaign 
would be 3lb. of grain per day and at least 2 qt.(i.e. circa 1.9.l.) of water per day. He 
refers that this would be the minimal quantity of water required for men, who 
marched through hot terrain with grain supplies as a basic food for their diet.474 
Every soldier in Alexander’s army would require 3600 calories per day, 1.36 kg. (i.e. 
circa 3lb) of bread and 1.9 l. of water.475 As in the Roman army, the basic food for 
the Macedonians was the grain ration of wheat, barley or millet, because they were 
the most readily accessible foods to be found during the campaign, and the easiest 
to transfer, once dried, they could be saved indefinitely, and in hot weather in 
contrast with meat, fish, vegetables or fruit.476 
 Supposing that adequate water and food supplies were available, a phalanx 
which compromised by 1.500 phalangites might need 2.25 short tons of dry rations 
per day, while a companion cavalry squadron of 215 individuals might need 1.4. 
short tons for both, men and horses. Marches through deserts, through infertile 
paths in mountains, through rough areas, or inhabited areas, would affect the 
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logistics of water by decreasing the available provisions and increasing the amount 
that was required. In such circumstances, a phalanx battalion would need six short 
tons for daily use and the cavalry squadron would need 11.6 short tons. This would 
be an extreme obstacle for the soldiery at the supply train, with an obvious result in 
the army, which would suffer from famine, due to the fact that their meals would be 
poorer.477 
 The Macedonian soldier carried his military panoply and arms i.e. helmet, shield, 
greaves, sword and sarissa. Moreover, he had utensils and personal items in his kit. 
Other objects were his bedroll, blanket, tools for the construction of roads and of 
course, medical supplies.478 The burden of this load is circa 50 pounds and if we add 
the burden of the provisions of 30 days, which was almost forty pounds, we can 
calculate that a Macedonian soldier carried a burden of 80 or 90 pounds. In fact, a 
soldier can carry a burden of 80 pounds during a long journey without undue 
damage his health.479 It is extraordinary when one observes that certain military 
practices remain unchanged over the centuries. According to historian Vegetius The 
roman soldiers carried a burden of 75 pounds; this is the same burden that 
Napoleon’s troops carried at Waterloo in 1815 AD. The British in the attack of Bunker 
Hill at 1775 AD were carrying a burden of 80 pounds, as did the Macedonians more 
than 2000 years before them. Finally, the American troops in 1944 at Normandy 
carried 82 pounds of burden.480 
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c. The Campaign 
 
 
 As I already mentioned, Alexander started his campaign at the onset of spring. 
Because of the different level of the agricultural production of the ancient world, it 
was logical that the majority of the cities wouldn’t have the ability to feed a huge 
army and themselves sooner than the harvest.481 A general feature is that armies in 
ancient Hellas did not support military operations during the winter because the 
replenishment by sea and land was too difficult. Hence, Alexander was back in 
Macedonia for the winter of 336-335 BC.482 Furthermore, we can estimate that 
Alexander would probably need some supplies from the cities inside his kingdom 
during the Balkan campaign, while his soldiers carried with them their own 
provisions of food, according to Frontinus. Provisions for thirty days.  
 The luggage of every soldier comprised food provisions. The men were 
sometimes ordered to have pre-cooked food along with their luggage, for avoiding 
the weight of cooking items. This guidance was frequently connected with mobile 
expeditions. It has been suggested that the rations recommended was for a specific 
time, namely, two, three, four, or ten days. The ten-day provisions were the most 
frequent requirement that has been affirmed, which was for expeditions that would 
last for some unknown period of time, for sure for more than four days.483 Εngels 
estimates that in an environment with abundance of water and forage for the 
horses, that only grain was necessary to carried, the army could carry only 10 days 
provisions and still the number of animals for larger routes would be enormous.484 
We already mentioned the restricted availability of pack animals for the 
Macedonians since the livestock was costly for the ancient farmer. Moreover, 
according to Engels there is yet another problem, which is the finding and sharing of 
so many supplies for so many animals by the embryonic developed system of 
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transport of the army.485 On the other hand, Gabriel seems to believe Frontinus, by 
supporting that Philip’s army could cover 300 miles with 25 days supplies, while it 
would have 5 days supplies as reserve, before his need to renew the provisions.486 
 The Macedonian army passed from Amphipolis, which from 357 BC. was a 
Macedonian city, and remained in Macedonia until it became the capital of the first 
district without losing its Macedonian tradition, until the end of the ancient world.487 
Everything that the army would need, was probably received from the ex-Athenian 
colony. We must always have in our mind that in the Balkan campaign Alexander had 
rivers next to him. Here, they are the Strymon and then the Nestus. These rivers 
were suitable for providing his men and animals (horses of cavalry and pack animals) 
with water supplies. Marches were frequently made from river to river because of 
the confined capacity of overland transportation, which didn’t allow large amount of 
food to be carried overland.488 
 Forage was concentrated from the fields489 and the densely forested mountains 
of the Thracians would be perfect for feeding the animals of the army. Whereas, the 
men were fed by their own supplies that they had received from Macedonia, namely 
Pella and Amphipolis. When the troops of Alexander crossed the Nestus, his army 
marched for ten days, 240 kilometers i.e. 150 miles. It is likely that the animals again 
were supplied by the central plain of Marica.490 
 Gabriel states that Philip’s army and in this case Alexander’s troops, could reach 
Paeonia and Illyria only in ten days’ march. (Image 10) Namely, the Macedonians 
could cover in ten days of marching circa 150 miles. Furthermore, Gabriel 
convincingly continues by referring that once the forces were in the region of the 
target, the troops could remain using their own supplies for 14 days and if required, 
to continue the march.491 Gabriel estimates that the distance from Pella to Nestus 
River was also a ten-day march. From Philippi to Byzantium,(240 miles) or north to 
Scythia (200 miles) was longer and still these routes remained in the strategic range 
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of the army. From Philippi the Macedonians could reach the land of Triballians and 
Getae only in ten days march.492 
  Although Gabriel presents a situation that seems to have no problems in the 
logistic field, it is necessary to refer that some replenishment may have occurred 
from Philippopolis (Plovdiv), which was a friendly territory.493 Philip’s town was 
located on the plain of Marica and stayed at the crossroads of communications. It is 
likely that other significant towns in special positions which Philip established were 
in strategic places on the trails which led out of the flatland.494 It was Philip’s policy 
to establish fortresses and towns in specific and useful locations, which would 
operate as supply storage for the future. This system allowed Philip to march inside 
his line of communication and supplementation and even to receive troops from 
these forts.495 
 Moreover, another ingesting point is the non-hostility of the Odrysians. The 
Odrysians didn’t take advantage of the death of Philip with a hostile revolt and they 
didn’t communicate with the plotters, with Attalos, or with Athens.496 I would like to 
add that The Odrysae remained inactive without manifesting any warfare action, 
although they could either cooperate with Thracian tribes in the war against 
Alexander or hit him from behind when the Macedonians would fight off the enemy 
in the Danube area. Even an invasion in Macedonia, as long as Alexander was far 
away could happen, which would be deadly and perhaps effective enough to bring 
terrible disruption and failure in the Balkan campaign of Alexander. However, the 
Odrysae did not take advantage of these opportunities and remained inert. 
Xydopoulos correctly says that it is possible that the great diplomatic policy of Philip 
II during his reign and the fear of Macedonian revenge, were the reasons which 
prevented Odrysae to revolt against Macedon. Xydopoulos refers that the no 
mention of Odrysae in the narrative of Arrian is an indication that the Odrysae were 
under the authority of the Macedonian king, “therefore acting according to what 
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Macedonian king commanded” Xydopoulos states.497 Alexander enjoyed a good 
relationship with the royal house of Odrysae, due to the fact that one of Alexander’s 
commanders bore the Odrysae name Sitalces, the Odrysae offered a squadron of 
cavalry recruited from the Odrysian elite and Odrysian infantry troops to the Asia 
campaign of Alexander as I already mentioned.498I tend to think, that it would not be 
illogical if the Odrysae supported the supplementation of the Macedonian army, 
during the Balkan campaign. 
 Alexander faced some combined forces of Thracians at Mt. Haemus and 
successfully prevailed. The Thracians lost their women, children and all their 
possessions grabbed by Macedonians.499 Although there is no report of plundered 
villages and fields, as it is logical to occur and occurs in every war, i.e. victory in the 
battle leads to the unprotected countryside and offers the chance to the winner to 
provide himself with slaves, cattle and other chattels. This was a measure with the 
aim of enforcing dominance and to ensure the rear for a further march.500Until Mt. 
Haemus there seems no problem with the logistics of the soldiery. Also, the Mt. 
Haemus is in the logistical range of Philip’s troop according to Gabriel.501 
  After this achievement, Alexander advanced to the land of Triballians. In their 
region from the details of Arrian we can observe again a river, which is Lyginus and a 
dense forest that saved the Triballians when they retreated during the battle. Hence, 
we have water supplies and forage for animals.  After the battle, Alexander maybe 
took some booty from the land of Triballians, who might had left supplies and 
animals in their abandoned villages and houses. Although, we know that the 
unarmed population of Triballians sought refuge to Peuce a small island on the 
Danube.502 Therefore, they perhaps took with them every amount of food supply 
they could carry. Alexander’s army was huge and I tend to think that this was the 
first time and place that his men were maybe at the limit of their supplies. If the men 
knew how to fish and had some fishing tools in their kit, then they would be fed, 
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especially in Nestus, but for the Lyginus, we have no information about a river. 
During the Asia campaign at a crucial logistic difficulty which created starvation, 
Curtius informs us that the army was fed by fish rivers and herbs.503 
 Three days after the second victorious battle against the Triballians, far away 
from Pella, Alexander reached Danube where he found his fleet. This fleet had come 
from Byzantium and delivered the provisions that the army required.504 Adams in his 
paper “Trajan and Macedonian highways” refers that sea and river communications 
are extremely significant for the logistic system of vast armies, which were 
campaigning far away from the sources of supply i.e. the fatherland.505 This seems to 
be the most practical reason for the appearance of the fleet at this crucial point. The 
two important obstructions to the replenishment of an army were, the restriction of 
overland transportation and the low level of most agricultural production. Because 
of these obstacles, the army could not stay self-efficient for long routes, where it 
was far away from navigable rivers or seaports.506 Moreover, for these reasons the 
army could not remain in one region for long periods, when it was far away from sea 
or rivers. Engels states that “The radius from which supplies could be effectively 
carried overland to the army was only 60 to 80 miles, and the army’s huge 
consumption rates would have quickly exhausted all the agricultural surplus within 
this limit.”507 So, the ingenuity of Alexander here is attested, who took advantage of 
the Danube river. At a serious length route, a horse or mule can carry 200 pounds; a 
light cart with two animals 1.000 pounds whilst a large merchant ship of that period 
circa 400 tons.508Although, it is referred that the fleet consisted of warships, that 
doesn’t change the fact that they transferred provisions for the expedition of the 
Macedonians. 
 After the failure of Alexander to conquer Peuce because of natural obstacles, he 
attacked to Getae who appeared on the opposite shore. Since it was the harvest 
period, there was a vast crop and Alexander would probably have thought that these 
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men would feed the population of Peuce. 509 Alexander’s force was full of provisions 
because of the fleet, although with the destruction of the Getic city when the Getae 
abandoned the field with their families and fled to Steppes, they left a great booty 
behind, which comprised of the supplies of the Getic army. Alexander again, sent 
back this booty to his fatherland.510 We must not forget, that the wealth was sent 
back, but everything else, useful for the campaign just as food supplies, would be 
kept along with the army. 
 Another interesting fact is the vast corps that the Macedonians smoothed down 
with the sarissae. Although it has been claimed that these corps devastated by 
Macedonians,511  it is most plausible that if these corps were not unharvested, they 
would possibly exploited by the army. We must not forget that there were a few 
servants that followed the army, i.e. one servant for ten soldiers and one for each 
cavalryman, these people carried hand mills for grinding grain to the camp and of 
course other gears. The Macedonian army knew how to survive on the land, 
whatever the season was.512 Furthermore, I would offer a paradigm from the Asia 
campaign, after the successful conquest of Rock of Sogdiana, one more impregnable 
Rock, the Rock of Chorienes fell to Macedonian domination, after the surrender of 
the foe to Alexander in a peaceful way. That winter, the army of Alexander had 
suffered, because of the snow and because of the lack of supplies. However, 
Chorienes offered supplies to the troops for two months, corn, wine and dried 
meat.513  This is an indication that there was stuff to exploit the vast corps. All in all, 
during that phase, it seems that the Macedonians were sufficiently supplied, where 
the bread could be produced, during the sojourn of Alexander in these regions, 
where he made peace with tribe leaders. Besides he was the winner and the 
conqueror of these wars and every demand of his could be easily fulfilled. 
 As we know from Arrian and Strabo, after this prosperous campaign in Thrace, 
many tribe leaders came to find Alexander, willing to seal an alliance with him.514 
After the triumphal crossing of the Danube in June, Arrian again omits to refer some 
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details. It is most feasible that Alexander made some deal with the Triballians and 
Thracians about defensive measures in that region. I.e. the defense of Danube line 
by north tribes, namely Getae and Scythians, and he would arrange some frontier 
disputes between Triballians and republican Thracians that lived near the Danube. 
Moreover, he could rearrange old treaties of his father’s with the Thracians or 
Scythian tribes. Also, he could arrange the recruitment of the Triballian and Odrysian 
troops and their preparation.515 It is plausible that under the sway of Alexander, 
there was a tithe demanded by the Macedonian authority and the troops we already 
mentioned.516 Definitely he put some affairs in order for his Asian campaign.517 
Although there is not a single reference in our sources about any kind of 
replenishment at this phase, I would strongly support that Alexander arranged to 
provide his army with supplies from all these tribes that became his new allies for 
the continuation of the Balkan campaign. I tend to think that the defeated Triballians 
and every tribe leader reinforced the army with necessary supplies. It makes sense, if 
that was the price for the favor of Alexander. 
 Afterwards, Alexander moved to the land of the Agrianians and Paeonians. As we 
know Agrianians were allies and friends, while Paeonians were not a threat. So here 
there is again no logistic problem. Of course, the friendly Laggarus, would supply the 
army of Alexander, while the same with his Hypaspists518 became members of the 
army, with provisions from his kingdom. At this phase of the expedition, Alexander 
was informed about the anticipated Illyrian threat so it is possible, that here he 
organized his supplementation.  For the journey to Illyria, it is possible again that 
Alexander was supplied also by Paeonia (around Skopje) because Paeonians were 
incorporated to Macedonia.519 
 Once more we see that a river appears in the journey of Alexander. Arrian refers 
that Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ παρὰ τὸν Ἐριγόνα ποταμὸν πορευόμενος ἐς Πέλλιον πόλιν 
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ἐστέλλετο.520This movement was serving his logistic plan. During the events of 
Pellion, we receive the only information of Arrian about the supplementation of 
Macedonians. Alexander sent Philotas with some cavalry troops and with the 
ὑποζύγια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐς ἐπισιτισμὸν ἔπεμπε.521 Alexander’s soldiery had 
a greatly organized logistic system under the accountability of a transport officer 
(skoidos). It is believed that one of the tasks of Parmenio in Asia was to handle this 
field, and as old and trusted general, he might have twenty or several years of 
experience as a logistician when Alexander was king. 522 At this point at Pellion, 
Parmenion’s son Philotas seems to be the officer for logistic missions. Finally, in this 
campaign we have the citation concerning the warfare supplies. At the crossing of 
the river, during the retreating maneuver of the Macedonian army, Alexander set up 
ἐπὶ τῇ ὄχθῃ τὰς μηχανὰς.523 
  When Alexander reached Pellion, he decided to camp close to the River 
Eordaicus for logical reasons, i.e. to have some protection and to provide his men 
and horses with water. He was not so close to Pellion. We can station him at the 
junction of Devoll with the old river of Ventrok which probably is the Eordaicus. With 
his camp in this location, he had access to the flatland of Poloske for the pasturing of 
his horses, and the lines of communication with the fatherland were free.524 
 Hammond refers that “It is likely that he (Alexander) came to Pelion late in July or 
early in August where the harvest was already in and the plain was brown. At this 
time of the year the sheep were in the highland pastures, and the rivers were low.525 
As we see, the environment was friendly for foraging missions, but the maneuvers 
and the plans of the enemy were the main obstacles. 
 The first logistic problem occurred with the incident of blockade of the city. After 
his initial success of the first battle with the Dardanians, before the arrival of 
Glaukias, Alexander had the advantage of gathering supplies and obtain pasture 
from the flatland of Poloske.526 However, it is a truly strange idea that of a 
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circumvallation, since Alexander knew that Glaukias was on his way and he would 
want to unite forces with Cleitus which would create serious problems for his 
supplementation as long as the wall was being built. Of course, his supplementation 
occurred either through the Gryke e Ujkut (Wolf’s pass) which the rival could 
threaten or over the mountains ridge, which was the watershed between the Devoll 
and the Haliacmon. As his supply animals left the Poloske plain and entered the 
highland, they would be attacked by the light-troops of Illyrians. It would seem more 
logical if Alexander had sacked the city.527 
 English supports, that Alexander expected for his Illyrian campaign to be short 
and that the city would be captured and the local tribesmen would be subjugated 
without much difficulty. In this vein, Alexander began the expedition with basic 
supplies believing that he could feed and retain his troops from the land of the 
Balkans for this short campaign. The appearance of the king of Taulantians creates 
two important logistic troubles for Alexander. Firstly, Alexander had to send a 
foraging mission to gather supplies for the troops and secondly the pack animals 
would need to graze.528 
 When Alexander was in desperate position, he ordered Philotas to obtain food. 
The flatland that Philotas intended to supply food and pasture was not the flatland 
near Pellion, in fact it was a significant way off, since the position of Philotas troops 
was an issue of report to Alexander and not of observation. Moreover, the hazard of 
the night-fall, indicates that there was serious distance between the camp of 
Alexander and the troops of Philotas. The clear flatland that was selected was the 
richest in the region, that of Korçë, well-watered and swampy in antiquity. So we 
may assume that Philotas passed through the Tsangon pass into that flatland which 
is eight kilometers away from Pellion.529 The mountains that surrounds the flatland 
are not the rather distant mountains which enclose the flatland of Poloskë, but the 
mountains which surrounding the Tsagon Pass, a group of short mountains that the 
troops of Glaukias, could occupy some positions there.530 There is no reference 
about the level of success of the foraging mission, nevertheless if we judge from the 
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shortness of the expedition it seems implausible that many supplies were 
concentrated.531 
 Nevertheless, this was a brief breath for Alexander and his men. Because of the 
severe situation Alexander started his risqué endeavor with the aim of passing 
through the Wolf pass. There, in the river Alexander used his siege machine. Here 
English attests that this artillery was a part of the siege train, which was obviously on 
its way to Pellion, although it had not arrived in time when Alexander was sieging the 
city.532 We can suppose that this artillery came from Pella, according to Marsden 
who claims that the headquarters of Philip’s department of mechanical engineering 
was likely located in Pella.533 As we saw in Chapter III, during the risky retreat 
mission, Alexander left his baggage animals to his camp, while the catapults follow 
the fighting force during the parade drills and later in the fighting where the 
catapults proved worthy. This was a tactic, although it seemed dangerous because 
he had left his supplies in a hostile region.534 
  After the brilliant retreat, Alexander and his army had the opportunity to obtain 
food from the Ventrok and Prespa basins, and his line of communication with Lyncus 
were open, furthermore he could withdraw to Lyncus, if he desired.535 So, in this 
phase, the logistical danger for Alexander was finished. After the unexpected attack 
against the Dardanians and Taulantians, Alexander took back all the possessions of 
the army that had been left in the camp and gained the booty of the enemy. 536 After 
this victorious campaign Alexander punished the rebellious Thebe, while his army 
was sufficiently supplied for the new expedition. 
 Gabriel estimates that the total efficiency of Macedonian army which was a 
compromise of velocity, logistical support and combat power, appeared in the 
Balkan campaign of Alexander. In this furious campaign, Alexander’s troops crossed 
circa 2000 kilometers from Pella until the appearance of Alexander to Thebes. In all 
this campaign again, the alterations of Philip were present, who enabled his army to 
strike with velocity, logistical autarky and combat power against any opponent from 
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the Danube River to the Adriatic Sea.537 As Fox adds, for the first time, distance 
pause to affect the mobility of the army in the Balkan warfare.538 
  In conclusion, we saw and analyzed the logistical model of Philip. In reality, we 
know nothing about Alexander’s logistical movements in the Balkan campaign. 
However, Martin and Blackwell state that Alexander was capable of the logistical 
challenges of land navigation and victualling, towards a rapid invading warfare.539 
Something that proved to be the Balkan campaign. Since Alexander struck his 
enemies before they could create a serious problem for him.540 The only logistical 
incident which appears in the campaign of 335 BC. was at Pellion, which shed light to 
the action of Alexander in this field.   
 I tend to think that we cannot know with certainty concerning Alexander’s 
logistical abilities, let alone, here in the Balkan campaign where Alexander was 
justified from the lack of experience. We saw that Engels and other scholars support 
Alexander’s ability and characterize him as a great logistician who always planned his 
movements very warily before starting the action. Although, here we have an 
Alexander who was in great risk for the supplementation of the army and we can use 
the conclusion of Holt in his paper “Impericum Macedonicum and the east: the 
problem of logistics “, who refers that: “The further implication, of course, is that the 
king was not always so meticulous or methodical in his planning, and often not able 
to anticipate staggering supply problems. Yet, when a crisis did arise, Alexander was 
quick to intervene, ready to lead by example and to show genuine concern for his 
suffering soldiers. In fact, his heroic response in the Turkestan desert, and his order to 
slaughter the beasts of burden in the Hindu Kush, are nearly all that we can see of 
the king’s personal attention to problems of supply.541A similar action is confirmed in 
the Illyrian campaign, when we see that Alexander through heroic reaction saved his 
troops, however because of his high confidence and desire for winning, in 
combination with his underestimation of the Illyrian troops, had as a result that he 
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was trapped. All in all, the Illyrian campaign was a great lesson for Alexander’s 
logistics, although in Asia he faced again similar and worse situations. 
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                                          Conclusions  
 
 
   
 At 336 B.C, Alexander inherited a kingdom which was under multiple threats. 
With a rapid reaction he ceased the unrest and hostility of south Hellenes for some 
time. Afterwards, the next target were the northwest tribes, who had manifested 
their enmity towards the Macedonian authority. The Balkan campaign started in 335 
B.C. 
  The main reason for the realization of the Balkan campaign was the security of 
Macedonia and an infliction of conformance of the Balkan tribes, through total 
conquest until Danube River. Without the Balkan campaign, there would be no 
opportunity for the actualization of the Asia campaign, while if there was no success 
in the northwest fighting, Alexander would not be remembered as being  
“Great”. However, through the Balkan campaign Alexander exploited other strategic 
aims. To begin with, the absolute establishment of his authority on the Macedonian 
throne by winning the trust of his men, the creation of the image of the warrior king, 
preparation and exercise of the troops for the Asia expedition, the reinforcement of 
the royal treasure by the booties of the rivals, the recruitment of Balkan troops 
which strengthened his army, the operation of Antipater as regent, whilst the 
attitude of Hellenes were tested while Alexander was absent and finally the 
occupation of Central Thrace with the key position of Hellespont which would be an 
extremely precious base for Alexander’s lines of communication, and valuable 
source of replenishment during the Asian campaign. 
 The warfare in Thrace was very successful and Alexander pushed the frontier 
until Danube. In this campaign, we have the first signs of the genius of Alexander in 
the strategic field, where his ruses and tactics, which were combined movements of 
several military units, against the autonomous Thracians and Triballians are worthy 
of admiration. Moreover, Alexander exploited the presence of the Danube river for 
establishing his northern frontier, while his crossing in one day was the incident that 
provoked fear in the Γέτας τοὺς ἀπαθανατίζοντας , who fled in humiliation towards 
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the Steppes and made the Syrmus and his Triballians, who were at Peuce to 
surrender themselves to the will of the conqueror. 
 However, Alexander’s enemies proved to be inferior in discipline and armory. 
This is one of the major reasons why they failed to crash Alexander and why 
Alexander succeeded. The only enemy who offered an equivalent conflict was the 
army of the Triballians, who perished when the main Macedonians forces arrived in 
the heat of the battle. 
 In the Illyrian campaign, we have an Alexander that divided the spirits regarding 
charisma on the strategic field. To begin with, besiege of Pellion and the fact that he 
was trapped by the Illyrian forces, has been expressed as tactical mistakes by the 
authorities. This carelessness was only justified by his brilliant retreat maneuver and 
by the fact that there were no casualties from the Illyrian war, as and in the Balkan 
campaign in general. On the other hand, we should emphasize that the inferiority of 
the enemies of Alexander, is clearly apparent in the events of Pellion, while 
Alexander knew very well the superiority of his army. 
 Of course, the success of Alexander against the Illyrians was due to his courage, 
brilliance and military commandership, however, the inability of the Dardanians and 
Taulantians to confront a highly trained army was the main reason for Alexander’s 
accomplishment. Τhe Illyrians had trapped Alexander into a desperate position with 
no supplies; they had the advantage of the hills, the fortified city and finally they had 
larger forces. Nevertheless, in every operation and battle they failed remarkably and 
retreated many times, without even giving a single fight. As already mentioned 
above, Alexander faced some serious difficulties and managed to escape, because 
the Illyrians didn’t offer him a dignified battle as the Triballians did. In fact, the 
psychological exploitation of tribal contumacy was one of the strongest weapons of 
Alexander. Something that proved effective against the Getae and, of course the 
Illyrians. 
  As long for the intelligence system, again there is strife on its efficiency. We saw 
an Alexander who was informed about the hostility of the Balkan tribes from the 
beginning of his reign, while a hetairos Corragos was responsible for notifying 
Alexander of an Illyrian threat. The efficiency of this intelligence system is reinforced 
by the arrival of ἄγγελοι, who informed Alexander about the Illyrian revolt of Cleitus, 
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Glaukias and Autariatae. Moreover, the information that Philotas troops were in 
danger because of Glaukias is one more indication that the logistic system was 
effective, while the same incident reveals a strong possibility that Glaukias had 
established an intelligent system too. Nevertheless, the fact that Alexander set up a 
besiege and ignored the arrival of Glaukias, maybe was a result of the weakness of 
the intelligence system according to some scholars, something that seems untenable 
to me. I tend to think that the intelligence system proved effective during the Balkan 
expedition, while the blockade of Pellion occurred because Alexander thought that 
he had time to destroy Cleitus first and then to direct to Glaukias and because he 
never felt fear for the arrival of Glaukias. 
 In the logistic field, during the early reign of Alexander, we clearly see the logistic 
model that Philip established which was successfully designed for military operations 
on the Balkan terrain. Philip, lightened his logistic baggage by ordering his troops to 
carry their own provisions and armors while he had a restricted number of animals 
and attendants to accompany and serve the army. In this way, he created a rapid 
army with great operational range. In the Balkan campaign of Alexander, the army 
survived by the land and by the booty of the defeated rivals.  
  The only citation to the logistic affairs is at the events of Pellion when Philotas 
was ordered to obtain food, when the position of Macedonians started to become 
desperate. In this phase, we see again a heroic Alexander who saved his foraging 
mission but anew we face strong contradiction as to the view, which presents 
Alexander as a meticulous commander with great abilities in the logistic field.  
  Alexander was found in this desperate position because he underestimate the 
foe and he was urged by his strong desire for win. However, in his defense, we must 
not omit to mention that Alexander was only twenty-one year old and king of 
Macedon for only a short period of time. So, he wasn’t a paradigm of experience, 
and the incident of Philotas is not enough to allow us to criticize Alexander's ability 
in the field of logistics, at least for the Balkan campaign.  His enthralling escape from 
the vast danger through the Wolf Pass, is enough to eliminate every doubt about 
Alexander’s strategical and tactical skills at the Balkan campaign while presents the 
strong desire of Alexander for victory. As Fuller marks out, in the Balkan campaign 
Alexander never lost control and never allowed panic or desperation to affect him. 
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He was dominant over every situation and always found a way to save himself and 
his troops from the most difficult occasions.542 The Balkan campaign taking account 
of all of Alexander’s “errors”, is generally estimated as symbolizing the unique 
dynamism of Alexander. In the end, no one can conclude this campaign better than 
Diodorus. 
 Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταραχὰς καταπαύσας ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ 
τὴν Θρᾴκην καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἔθνη Θρᾴκια ταραττόμενα καταπληξάμενος 
ὑποταγῆναι κατηνάγκασεν, ἐπῆλθεν δὲ καὶ τὴν Παιονίαν καὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα 
καὶ τὰς ὁμόρους ταύταις χώρας καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν κατοικούντων βαρβάρων 
ἀφεστηκότας χειρωσάμενος ὑπηκόους πάντας τοὺς πλησιοχώρους 
βαρβάρους ἐποιήσατο.543 
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Image 1:   THE BALKAN AREA 
Source: HAMMOND, N. G. L., WALBANK, F. W., A History of Macedonia, vol. III, 
Oxford 1988.   p.33 
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Image 2: Thracian peltast, detail of an Attic red-figured kylix in the manner of 
Onesimos. About 480 B.C. Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University, Bequest of David 
M. Robinson, 1959.219 
Source: Casson L., “The Thracians”, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 1, The Thracians, 1977, 2-6. p.5. 
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Image 3: Representation of the maneuver.   
Source: Sheppard R., (Ed), Alexander the great at war, Oxford 2008.   p.73. 
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Image 4: Representation of the Battle at Mt. Haemus. 
Source: Dodge T.A., Alexander, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2004. p.191. 
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Image 5: Representation of the battle at the Lyginus River. 
Source: Dodge T.A., Alexander, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2004 p.193. 
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Image 6: Representation of the war operation against the Getae. 
Source: Dodge T.A., Alexander, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2004 p.195. 
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Image 7: P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 7: Brit. Libr.3085, courtesy the British Library. The fragments of the 
Ptolemaic Papyri. Source: Clarysse W. and Schepens G., “A ptolemaic fragment of 
an Alexander history”, Chronique d’Egypte 1985 LX: 30-47. p.31. 
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Image 8:  The text of the Ptolemaic Papyri. Source: Clarysse W. and Schepens G., “A 
Ptolemaic fragment of an Alexander history”, Chronique d’Egypte 1985 LX : 30-47. p.40. 
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Image 9: Alexander’s Dispositions at Pellion 
Source: HAMMOND, N. G. L., WALBANK, F. W., A History of Macedonia, vol. III, Oxford 1988.   
p. 42. 
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  Image 10: Logistical Range of Philip’s army. Source: Gabriel R.A., Philip II of Macedonia Greater 
Than Alexander, Washington D.C., 2010.  p.89. 
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